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This Article maps financial crisis containment—extraordinary measures to
stop the spread of financial distress—as a category of legal and policy choice. I
make three claims.
First, containment is distinct from financial regulation, crisis prevention and
resolution. Containment is brief; it targets the immediate term. It involves claims
of emergency, rule-breaking, time inconsistency and moral hazard. In contrast,
regulation, prevention and resolution seek to establish sound incentives for the
long term. Second, containment decisions deviate from non-crisis norms in
predictable ways, and are consistent across diverse countries and crises.
Containment invariably entails three kinds of choices: choices between wholesale
and case-by-case response to financial distress, choices about whether to enforce
private contracts and government regulations, and choices about distributing
losses from crisis. I illustrate these with case studies from Indonesia in 1997–
1998, Japan in 1994–1998, the United States in 1933, Argentina in 2001–2002,
and Mexico in 1982. Third, containment measures are costly, but so is failure to
distinguish containment from other tasks. Governments use prevention and
regulation rhetoric to delay crisis response and to obscure distribution. Once they
admit to a crisis, officials may leverage the urgency of containment to secure farreaching economic reform.
Isolating and mapping containment can help recast well-worn crisis policy
debates, and make crisis response more transparent and accountable.
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Financial Crisis Containment
ANNA GELPERN ∗
F

I. INTRODUCTION: BEAR STEARNS, NORTHERN ROCK AND
MEMORIES OF SEOUL

0B

On the evening of March 13, 2008, U.S. Treasury officials got on the
phone with their colleagues at the Federal Reserve and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 1 A big investment bank was on the verge of
bankruptcy in deeply stressed credit markets. Bear Stearns had a network
of large, complex positions that linked it with many parts of the U.S. and
global financial system. Faced with the risk of widespread collapse, the
regulators arranged a shotgun marriage between Bear and its banker, J.P.
Morgan, complete with a $30 billion dowry from the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. 2
The episode is an example of financial crisis containment, 3 a category
of extraordinary policy measures to stop the spread of untold economic
damage, akin to containing a fire or infectious disease. Despite the rhetoric
of exception that surrounds every instance of containment, even a casual
inquiry reveals it to be a fixture of global finance.
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F

F

F

∗
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Law, George Washington University School of Law, the American Association of Law Schools and the
International Studies Association for helpful insights, to Sarah Jaramillo, A.J. LaRosa and Kelly
Targett for excellent research assistance, to the editors of this volume for valuable input and patience,
and to the Dean’s Fund at Rutgers—Newark for financial support.
1
See, e.g., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 1 (Apr. 3, 2008)
(statement of Timothy F. Geithner, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), available
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/OpgStmtGeithner4308Testimony.pdf.
2
JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Summary of Terms and
Conditions (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/
Contract.pdf. The loan was later reduced to $29 billion. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 24, 2008), available
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080324b.html.
3
I use the term with apologies to George Kennan, who in 1947 famously advocated “long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies,” framing U.S. foreign
policy under the rubric of containment for decades after. X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 566 (1947). My use differs somewhat from Kennan’s, especially with respect to
time horizons, though the element of damage control remains.
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In November 1997, the fourth largest securities house in Japan fell
after disclosing massive hidden debts. The image of Yamaichi Securities’
president crying at the press conference 4 became an icon of Japan’s “lost
decade.” The government had tried to persuade Yamaichi’s bank to take
over the business. The bank refused, itself under water. The firm folded,
but not before drawing billions in public funds to pay its creditors—an
effort to avoid further disruption to fragile domestic and global markets. 5
In August 1997, foreigners stopped lending to Korean banks. 6 To
shore up confidence, the Korean government announced a blanket
guarantee of bank liabilities. 7 U.S. and U.K. officials were indignant: the
guarantee would bail out the reckless, and encourage more recklessness. 8
In any event, the guarantee failed to stop the slide. Finance ministers from
the world’s richest economies spent the next Christmas pleading with the
world’s top bankers to renew loans to Korean banks. 9
In September 2007, a British bank called Northern Rock had trouble
refinancing its debt in the increasingly wobbly global markets. To halt a
run on deposits, the U.K. authorities reprised Korea’s blanket guarantee of
the banking system, and soon nationalized Northern Rock. 10
In December 2001, Argentina devalued its currency and defaulted on
$100 billion in foreign bonds, capping off a year of political turmoil, bank
runs and deepening economic depression. The government then converted
all dollar-denominated domestic debt contracts and bank deposits into
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4

GILLIAN TETT, SAVING THE SUN: HOW WALL STREET MAVERICKS SHOOK UP JAPAN’S
FINANCIAL WORLD AND MADE BILLIONS 105 (2004).
5
HIROSHI NAKASO, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN JAPAN DURING
THE 1990S: HOW THE BANK OF JAPAN RESPONDED AND THE LESSONS LEARNT 9–11 (2001), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf?noframes=1; TETT, supra note 4, at xxiii, 106.
6
PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
AND HUMBLED THE IMF 125 (2001).
7
MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CURES, AND SYSTEMIC
IMPLICATIONS 39 (1998); Carl-Johan Lindgren et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring:
Lessons from Asia, 16 n. 17 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 188, 1999), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/opFinsec/op188.pdf. The initial guarantee was limited to a
vaguely defined category of external liabilities. Id. It was expanded to all liabilities in November. Id.
at 18–19.
8
See GROUP OF TWENTY-TWO (G-22) WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES,
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES 7–9 (1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/ifcrep.pdf; G-22 WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS vi-vii, 20–21, 25, 27, 33, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/sfsrep.pdf (criticizing
blanket guarantees extended in financial crisis and reflecting the policy sentiment of the day).
9
BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 198–202..
10
See e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, FIFTH REPORT
OF SESSION 2007–08, 36–37, 140–41 (2008), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf; David Stringer, Britain to Nationalize Northern Rock
Bank, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at A-11. For one of many criticisms of the nationalization of
Northern Rock, see William Buiter’s Maverecon blog for FT.com. Immoral Hazard and Northern
Rock, available at http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2008/02/immoral-hazard-and-northern-rock/ (Feb.
19, 2008, 18:58 EST).
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devalued pesos. Argentine courts upheld the measure to rewrite private
contracts, citing Argentine precedent that relied on U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence from the 1930s. 11
In these cases and many others like them, rules were suspended as
policymakers tried to hang on to the precipice. A different set of
regularities replaced them. This Article is an effort to describe the new
regularities, which comprise containment, and to show why it is important
to conceive of them as a distinct category of legal and policy choice.
Containment is often conflated with financial regulation, crisis
prevention and resolution. These are all long-term projects that share the
goal of entrenching sound economic incentives, often embodied in positive
rules. In contrast, containment is urgent and brief, defined by rulebreaking, claims of exception and the dearth of positive law. The
paramount goal is “to stop the bleeding”; 12 the long view falls by the
wayside. As they practice containment, formerly stern and stingy officials
dole out bailouts and sow the seeds of future gambling—time
inconsistency and moral hazard problems loom large.
The persistent specter of such problems helps explain why containment
inhabits a negative space in law and policy, unacknowledged in the run-up
to crisis and renounced in its aftermath. Judging financial crisis
containment by the standards of regulation, prevention and resolution is
doomed to yield a failing grade and a feckless promise to hold firm the
next time. Acknowledging and defining containment opens it to critical
analysis. On the one hand, isolating containment helps explain why some
well-worn paradigms—sanctity of contracts, moral hazard, and the
liquidity-solvency distinction—fall so flat so consistently in crisis after
crisis. On the other hand, it reveals the importance of other ideas, such as
distribution, accountability, and path dependence, which receive less
attention than they should.
This Article maps containment using examples from Asia, Latin
America and the United States. Although each episode involves a
departure from non-crisis norms for resolving financial distress, such
departures follow a consistent pattern across radically different crises in
rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian states. First, faced with the
F

F

F

11
See Horacio Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 129, 142–44 (2008) (pointing to the reliance of the Argentine courts on Home Building & Loan
Ass’n v. Blaisdell in the Avico v. de la Pesa, Bustos v. Estadio Nationale and Massa v. Poder Ejecutivo
National cases, which applied the doctrine of economic emergency).
12
See, e.g., Paul R. LaMonica, Commentary: The Fed Tries to Stop the Bleeding, CNNMONEY,
Sep. 18, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/18/markets/thebuzz/index.htm?postversion=200809
1814; Robert Gavin, A Plan to Stop the Bleeding: Federal Authorities Would Buy Troubled Mortgages,
Securities; Support in Congress Likely, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS,
News Library, BGLOBE file (referring, respectively, to a plan by central banks to inject liquidity into
the markets, and a proposal by the U.S. Treasury to buy troubled mortgage assets from financial
institutions).
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prospect of mass default, policy makers choose between case-by-case and
wholesale response. Second, they decide whether to enforce private
contracts and their own regulations. Third, they begin to allocate losses
from the crisis among their constituents.
Financial distress in ordinary times is resolved case-by-case, through
renegotiation, default, or bankruptcy. 13 These tools rely on market
valuation and an administrative infrastructure designed for a relatively low
rate of failure in the economy. In crisis, they may be inadequate: markets
vanish, and with them, market valuation; panic, contagion and widespread
distress overwhelm the resolution infrastructure. Yet the alternative—
wholesale subsidies or across-the-board restructuring—is unappealing. By
definition, it is over- and under-inclusive: it may fail the prudent, save the
profligate, and spawn moral hazard.
Governments generally enforce private contracts, except in
bankruptcy, where contracts yield to a public debt adjustment proceeding.
Enforcing contracts in crisis can exacerbate distress. For example, where a
large portion of all debtors cannot pay, enforcement may trigger spillover
effects throughout the economy. Separately, otherwise unobjectionable
contract terms—such as those indexing debts to gold or foreign currency—
if widespread, may bring on financial instability. 14 In either case,
individual creditors have no incentive to compromise for the sake of the
economy. 15 In response, governments may assume private debts or rewrite
private contracts. 16 Assuming debts costs public money; failure to enforce
contracts is costly in a different way: it can disrupt commercial
expectations, undermine incentives to perform, and faith in the rule of
law. 17
Similarly, in ordinary times, governments enforce their own
F
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13

Bankruptcy is a collective proceeding for creditors; however, each debtor’s case is resolved
individually.
14
Debt contracts indexed to foreign currency or commodity prices are designed to offset the
effects of devaluation. Where the domestic currency declines in value, indexation increases the debt
burden and eliminates the policy benefits of devaluation. This aggregate effect does not depend on any
particular borrower’s capacity to perform any given contract. Anne-Marie Gulde et al., Dealing with
Banking Crises in Dollarized Economies, in MANAGING FINANCIAL CRISES: RECENT EXPERIENCE AND
LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA 54 (Charles Collyns & G. Russell Kincaid eds., 2003).
15
This is distinct from creditor collective action problems with respect to a single debtor, which
are addressed in a single collective bankruptcy proceeding.
16
NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS 87–93 (2004) (summarizing the
choices and related economic literature). For legal perspectives on enforcing contracts in crisis, see, for
example, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (establishing the
constitutionality of state foreclosure moratoria), and Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When
Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 449–50
(1993) (discussing the effects of enforcing municipal debts during the Great Depression).
17
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 449. (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“He simply closes his eyes to the
necessary implication of [this] decision who fails to see in it the potentiality of future gradual but everadvancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private and public contracts.”); see also Spector, supra
note 11, at 145.
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regulations. Doing so in crisis may backfire. For example, where a large
portion of the financial system becomes undercapitalized because its
borrowers are broke, strictly enforcing capital and accounting rules may
mean shutting down most banks and cutting off the credit essential to
recovery.
Each containment episode also entails loss distribution, which is
distinct from and in addition to loss limitation. Losses from financial
distress initially fall on debtors and creditors: a debtor may pay and fail, or
default, shifting loss onto creditors. Such losses may have spillover
effects, or may be politically unacceptable in their own right. In response,
government restructuring mandates can allocate losses between debtors
and creditors. An infusion of public money can shift losses onto taxpayers.
New private capital can absorb some of the losses. Public or private
money from abroad can spread the burden to foreigners.
Unlike loss limitation, distribution is politically costly. It requires
governments to choose among constituents, such as homeowners in Ohio,
investment banks in New York that repackaged their mortgages, and
municipalities in Florida or Norway that bought them.
In sum, containment may call for measures—wholesale treatment,
rewriting contracts, suspending regulations, and distributing losses—that
are legally and politically fraught. Governments delay and obscure such
measures as long as possible. Once forced to admit a crisis, officials may
leverage the sunk political cost of containment to transform the economic
landscape, for example, by enacting comprehensive regulation or creating
vast new power centers in the form of merged financial institutions.
Conflating containment with other kinds of financial policy can mask large
wealth transfers and major institutional change; it can make political
choices look technical and inevitable, reduce accountability and increase
the social cost of a crisis.
Starting with a description of containment as a category, this Article
seeks to shift the terms of the debate about crisis response. I argue that
much of what appears as rule-breaking in containment is neither good nor
bad, but unavoidable. Legal and institutional design for crisis response
should reflect this reality, with channels of accountability appropriate to
the tasks of containment. Part II sets out the context in which containment
decisions arise. Part III examines the relationship between containment
and prevention, regulation, and resolution, and the literature on economic
emergency. Part IV describes the recurring elements of containment: the
choice between wholesale and case-by-case response, the decision to
enforce, suspend or rewrite private contracts and regulations, and
judgments about distribution in crisis. Part V presents five crisis case
studies. Part VI concludes with policy implications.
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II. THE OBJECT OF CONTAINMENT

1B

Containment choices as described in this Article arise in a particular
subset of financial crises. Such crises are usually called systemic, either in
the sense that they threaten the financial system as a whole, or, less
frequently, in the sense that they threaten large parts of the economy
through finance channels. 18 Because the meaning of “systemic” is the
subject of a debate not directly relevant to my project, 19 I use this Part to
highlight specific crisis attributes that would prompt policy makers to
consider a containment response. In sum, if it is big enough, bad enough,
and moving fast and far enough, financial distress will as a matter of fact
prompt containment.
F

F

F

F

A. Scope

9B

A crisis that brings on containment usually imperils large parts of the
domestic, and occasionally global, financial system. This in turn threatens
the macroeconomy: economic growth, employment, prices, and
government finances. The ultimate concern is economic harm to a great
number of people. The number of financial firms at risk can be telling but
is not dispositive: mass failures usually merit containment, but so does the
18
This is the sense in which the word “systemic” is used in the phrase “systemic corporate crisis”.
See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Systemic Corporate Distress: A Legal Perspective, in RESOLUTION
OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DESIGN OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS 57
(Stijn Claessens et al., eds., 2001).
19
See generally SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 76, 101 (Patrick
Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005) (linking containment and systemic risk). Debates over the
definition of systemic risk usually take place in the context of systemic risk regulation. COMMITTEE ON
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, RISK MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMIC RISK: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRD JOINT CENTRAL BANK RESEARCH CONFERENCE 1–13 (2002) available at
http://www.bis.org/cgfs/conf/mar02.pdf (illustrating the evolution of official concern with systemic
risk); Timothy F. Geithner, President and C.E.O. of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks to the
Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference: Systemic Financial Crises-Resolving Large Bank
Insolvencies (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r041011a.pdf; Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (citing uncertainty
surrounding the definition and proposing to expand the concept of systemic risk beyond banks to
financial markets).
Because containment seeks to limit damage now spreading through known channels, it does not
raise the same information, incentive, or administrative resource concerns as ex-ante systemic risk
regulation. Regulation targets multiple risks at once without necessarily knowing the precise source,
magnitude or even nature of the harm that might come. Labeling risk from a future hypothetical event
as “systemic” is significant in the regulatory context because it may bring on broader, stricter oversight,
more overseers, and more generous insurance, perhaps with durable behavior changes among market
actors. In contrast, containment happens ex-post, when the harm has either materialized, or has become
much more certain. At this stage, calling the crisis “systemic” means that “the system” is in present
danger, which justifies an exceptional, perhaps wholesale, public response. Thus when the term
“systemic crisis” is used as a predicate for containment policies, it is almost invariably ex-post,
instrumental, and political. This is contrary to the regulatory aspiration in Steven Schwarcz’s recent
proposal: “[S]ystemic risk is an economic, not a political, definition. It should not be used uncritically
as an ex post political label for any large financial failure or downturn.” Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
supra, at 204. As I note in Part III, Schwarcz’s goal is to establish a regulatory regime. I argue that
containment is different, not least in its political content.
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failure of one large government savings bank that holds a significant
portion of the people’s deposits, or one large hedge fund with contractual
links to many others. An entity’s nodal position is important because it can
transmit distress far and wide. In addition, the failure of a financial
institution that supports important sectors of the real economy, such as
housing, can be critical even if it does not immediately affect the broader
markets. Disruption of market infrastructure, such as payments and
clearing systems, is important on its own and in conjunction with firm
failure. 20
To some extent, the authorties’ response determines whether a crisis is
perceived as one of mass individual insolvency or large institutional
failure. For example, where rescue measures focus on institutions that are
too big or too interconnected to fail, 21 they come to define a crisis. In the
same crisis, individual insolvency may be pervasive, but it recedes from
public view when the policy response to it is indirect, channeled through
institutions.
F

F

F

B. Path and Pace

10B

Crises spread through two kinds of transmission mechanisms, which
are not mutually exclusive. First, in a chain reaction, failure travels from
one or several entities to others throughout the financial system. 22 For
example, a run on one badly-managed bank can cause runs on banks with
contractual or ownership links to it, as well as copy-cat runs on good banks
unconnected with the original culprit. 23 Second, a common shock (for
F

F

F

F

20
Howell E. Jackson, Systemic Risk after Glass-Steagall Reform (July 12, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
21
On the role of contractual and institutional “interconnectedness” in transmitting risk throughout
the financial system, see, for example , Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Controlling Systemic Risk in an Era of
Financial Consolidation, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW (2002, 2005); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein,
International Standards for Consolidated Supervision of Financial Conglomerates: Controlling
Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J.INT’L 137, 138–42 (1993), Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge
Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 20 (Working Paper, 2009) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1339628_code349188.pdf?abstractid=1249441&mi
rid=1; Gillian Tett & Krishna Guha, The Cost of a Lifeline, FT.COM, April 24, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9812cd96-1197-11dd-a93b-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
22
Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 401 (1983); see also Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 196–97 (2008).
23
The two transmission mechanisms within the chain reaction category may be seen as distinct:
distress may spread through real links among dissimilar institutions (banks, hedge funds,
manufacturers), or through imitation among those perceived to share similar vulnerabilities (banks).
Yehning Chen, Banking Panics: The Role of the First-Come, First-Served Rule and Information
Externalities, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER 359
(Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Currency
Crises, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER, supra, at
379.
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example, a currency collapse) can affect everyone simultaneously. 24 Some
regulatory measures, such as a sudden change in provisioning rules, can
have the effect of a common shock, especially when the financial sector as
a whole is undercapitalized. International transmission mechanisms are
essentially similar. 25
The pace at which a crisis unfolds is important in its own right. A
sudden loss of confidence in institutions, such as banks, or in a country’s
currency, can trigger a run. Depositors or investors demand safe assets
(cash, hard currency, precious metals) and may rush to sell all at once,
depressing asset values. Certain kinds of contractual arrangements, such as
lending on margin, can mechanically replicate this effect: as the value of
collateral declines, “margin calls” for additional collateral can cause
market participants to liquidate assets en masse, setting off a spiral of
further losses. 26 Run-style crises can develop in a matter of hours, though
many have underlying causes that go back years. Other crises unfold in
slow motion, in tandem with a deepening economic slump, which might
cause the supply of capital to dry up as non-performing loans mount. It
may take years of loosely connected failures and ad-hoc responses before
the authorities recognize a system-wide pattern that prompts a change of
course, including broader, more muscular containment measures.
F

F

F

F

F

C. Timing: You Know You Are in Crisis When

11B

Deciding when financial distress justifies resort to extraordinary tools
is one of the most daunting policy challenges in crisis. In his classic case
for public intervention, Charles P. Kindleberger addressed timing with
cheeky understatement:
Timing presents a special problem. After a crash has
occurred, it is important to wait long enough for the insolvent
firms to fail, but not so long as to let the crisis spread to the
solvent firms that need liquidity . . . Whether too soon and
too much is worse than too little and too late is difficult to
specify. 27
F

The economics and politics of timing are equally intractable.
24
COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL
STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 5–7 (2005), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org
/crmpg2/docs /CRMPG-II.pdf; Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial
Supervision and Regulation?, 49 CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES, 181, 189–90 (2003) available at
http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/49/2/181.
25
ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 43–44.
26
Compare MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOW’S END: THE CRASH OF 1929, 237–38 (2001) (effect of
margin calls in 1929), with Posting of Yves Smith to nakedcapitalism blog, http://www.
nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/are-hedge-fund-margin-calls-leading-to.html (Oct. 10, 2008, 15:00 EST)
(effect of margin calls in 2008).
27
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS & CRASHES 13, 209 (5th ed. 2005).
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Recognizing that a financial crisis threatens the economy can amount to
admitting policy failure. Announcing that mass bankruptcy is nigh may
undermine confidence further. 28 In many cases, including those discussed
later in this Article, it may bring on a political crisis. Deploying
extraordinary measures too early may damage incentives to perform
contracts and monitor risk among debtors and creditors. On the other
hand, the risk of delay is particularly acute in a big, fast-moving financial
crisis. Waiting until everyone agrees on the magnitude of the threat may
mean flying off the cliff.
In practice, the timing of containment does not depend on real or
perceived economic necessity alone, but also on political and legal
possibility. Containment is not one seamless, externally determined phase
of a crisis, but rather a series of political decisions that may come in
concentrated spurts, or over time, alongside decisions on prevention,
regulation and restructuring.
Their focus on the immediate term
distinguishes containment decisions from the others; incidents such as the
Bear Stearns sale, which began this Article, acquire their singular status
through a combination of perceived threat, government response and
perfect hindsight. In all cases discussed in Part V, containment could have
come earlier or later, depending on one’s view of the underlying
economics. 29 Political acceptance of extraordinary measures was critical
to their economic and legal viability, and helped set their timing.
As a matter of fact, in every big financial crisis, there comes a time
when the authorities recognize that measures used to handle non-crisis
distress may not be enough—which is when they ask their staff to prepare
memos with “Plan B” in the title.
A government might consider containment when the country’s firms
must pay foreign debt twenty times the size of its hard currency reserves,
as happened in Korea in 1997. 30 Extraordinary response may be in order
when more than half of all firms in the economy are technically insolvent,
as happened in Indonesia in 1998, 31 or when the local currency has lost
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

28

F

Id.; ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 42 (describing shock from “disclosure of bad news”);
TETT, supra note 4, at 69 (2004) (contrasting Japanese regulatory forbearance with Swedish
enforcement: “We didn’t want to create panic in the financial markets or among consumers. We
wanted to deal with the problems slowly and calmly.” (quoting Ministry of Finance official)). But see
Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts? (U. Penn. Inst. for L. and Econ.
Research Paper, No. 09-11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362639
(arguing that bankruptcy of a major financial firm in an advanced institutional setting need not trigger
panic).
29
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the consensus is earlier.
30
See, e.g., BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 182.
31
See, e.g., Timothy Lane, et al., IMF Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A
Preliminary Assessment 4–5 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 178, 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/op/op178/OP178.pdf.
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three-quarters of its value, as happened in Argentina in early 2002. 32 Time
may be ripe for containment when private banks no longer heed the
government’s pleas to rescue ailing comrades, as happened in Japan in
1997 33 —or when the authorities shut down three hundred savings
institutions, and over six hundred line up the resolution pike, as happened
in the United States in the late 1980s. 34 So too it might be as officials get
on the phone at night to decide the fate of a big Wall Street investment
bank.
Yet in all these cases, policy makers may lack political capacity to
consider the full range of responses until things get worse and the public’s
perception of the crisis has caught up with theirs.
F

F

F

F

F

F

III. CONTAINMENT IN CONTEXT

2B

Containment rarely gets special mention in the vast economic 35 and
still-limited legal 36 literature on financial crises. As used in this Article—
F

F

F

F

32

See generally PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET,
THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA (2005); FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN
ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 182–86 (2006), Brad Setser
& Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Argentina, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 465
(2006).
33

TETT, supra note 4, at 74; NAKASO , supra note 5, at 4-5.
Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. (No. 2) 26, 27 (2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/banking/.
35
Examples from the economic literature on international financial crises alone are innumerable.
These range from big-picture overviews using vastly different methodologies, such as CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 27 and Kenneth Rogoff & Carmen M. Reinhart, This Time is Different: A
Panoramic View of Centuries of Financial Crises (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13882) (2008), to works driven by specific crisis episodes, such as NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER,
BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS (2004), SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION
(Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005), and STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32.
Other influential contributions include, for example, BARRY EICHENGREEN, ET AL., CRISIS? WHAT
CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995), Paul Krugman, Financing vs.
Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253 (1988). Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an
International
Lender
of
the
Last
Resort
(Apr.
20,
1995),
available
at
http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf. The economic literature on
domestic financial crises is even bigger. There is also a large political economy literature on crisis and
response. See e.g., ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE
THIRD WORLD (Joan M. Nelson, ed., 1990).
36
Apart from the growing literature on sovereign debt (see, e.g., Symposium, Odious Debt:
Exploring the Outer Limits of Sovereign Debt, N.C. J. INT’L L & COM. REG. 605 (2007); Symposium,
Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy, 53 EMORY L.J. 657
(2004); Symposium, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177 (2005); Symposium,
Sovereign Debt, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637 (2004) for recent examples), which unlike its economist
counterpart rarely ventures into broader crisis matters, U.S. law scholars have had relatively little to say
about economic crises, less about financial crises, and less yet about international financial crises. See
Daniel W. Levy, A Legal History of Irrational Exuberance, 48 CASE W. RES. 799, 803–04 (1998)
(observing the dearth of legal literature on economic distress); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermuele, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008 6
(Univ. Chicago Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 442), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301164 (“Financial crises are less familiar than security crises.”).
Exceptions from before the current crisis include, for example, Levy, supra (history of judicial
HU

34
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to describe resort to extraordinary legal and policy measures to limit
damage from financial distress—the concept usually appears unnamed in
the writing on crisis management and regulatory reform. 37 When used, the
term containment usually describes early-phase response to domestic
banking crises, 38 or efforts to stop crises from spreading internationally. 39
Both uses highlight the goal of stemming losses, but stop short of
elaborating the decision category. Containment choices in this literature
are often tinged with mistake and compromise, regrettable exceptions to be
avoided next time.
Like the economic and regulatory writing, U.S. law scholarship on
economic emergency deals with the use of extraordinary measures to
respond to economic stress, but it does so quite differently. Emergency is
not itself a policy category like regulation, but rather the predicate for a
broad range of responses to different crises. Authors who write about
economic emergency tend to concern themselves broadly with crisis
decision-making rather than economic and financial policy; they often
operate by analogy to security emergency. 40
This Part examines the relationship between containment and financial
regulation, and crisis prevention and crisis resolution. It concludes with a
brief discussion of containment as emergency response.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

response to financial panics); Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International
Financial Reform, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2001) (international financial crisis response). The related
but distinct category of writing on economic emergency includes CLINTON ROSSITER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 255–64
(1948, 2002) (on the rise of executive power during the Great Depression), Michael Belknap, The New
Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67 (1983) (discussing the use of wartime
powers in economic emergency); William E. Scheuerman, Exception and Emergency Powers: The
Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869 (May 2000) (discussing Carl Schmitt’s
theories of executive power in economic emergency), Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, SnapBack, Sag 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1279 (2005) (comparing doctrinal stickiness of judicial responses to
security and economic emergencies), and OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NI AIOLAN, LAW IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 76–79 (2006) (on the expansion of wartime
powers to economic exigency). Contributions inspired by the ongoing crisis include Posner &
Vermuele, supra, Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Big
Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. (2009) (forthcoming),
working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1306342.
37
See, e.g., Morris Goldstein, Making the G-20 Summit Work: The “Ten-Plus-Ten” Plan,
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/
realtime/?p=146 (Oct. 27, 2008) (recommendations for economic recovery/crisis management and
financial regulatory reform/crisis prevention).
38
See, e.g., Carl-Johan Lindgren, Pitfalls in Managing Closures of Financial Institutions, in
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 76 (Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven
eds., 2005).
39
ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 5, 43–44.
40
For criticisms of the security analogy, see generally, Levy, supra note 36. Politicians have used
it strategically beginning in the 20th century; scholars have adopted it as the dominant paradigm of
emergency decision-making. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933;
see also Belknap, supra note 36; Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36.
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A. Containment and Regulation

12B

Regulation looks to the future; containment to the present. The core
operational difference between the two is in the sequence of priorities.
Regulation first seeks to change incentives to reduce the risk of failure and
crisis; mitigating damage from crisis is contingent on the occurrence of a
crisis despite the regulatory effort. For containment, the priorities are
reversed: changing long-term incentives is relevant only if the financial
system survives the present calamity. 41
Public management of private risk-taking is at the core of financial
regulation. 42 Regulation tries to shape the behavior of firms and
individuals, for example, to reduce the likelihood of bank failure or
financial ruin of unsophisticated consumers. 43
Another aspect of
regulation goes to limiting the fallout from risks once they materialize. For
example, risk-based capital adequacy requirements work in two ways. Exante, they try to discourage excessive risk-taking by making it more costly
for the regulated firms. Ex-post, they seek to ensure that each firm has the
capital cushion to withstand economic shocks. Containment choices arise
strictly ex-post and seek immediate results.
In another example, a regulatory system fraught with moral hazard,
one that prompts excessive risk-taking, has failed in a central mission.
Containment policy that arrests financial collapse has met its goal; its
adverse effects in the long run are for resolution and regulation to mitigate.
The growing popularity of “macro-prudential” regulation 44 adds a
twist to the relationship between regulation and containment, but does not
change it. Macro-prudential regulation is preoccupied with overall
financial stability, as distinct from the protection of any particular
F

F

F

F

F

F

41

F

See, e.g., Mervyn King, Draft Opening Statement for Appearance before the Treasury
Committee, Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central Banks Do? 7 (Sept. 12, 2007), available
at http://media.ft.com/cms/a7ed52c2-6111-11dc-bf25-0000779fd2ac.pdf (“[T]here must be strong
grounds for believing that the absence of ex post insurance would lead to economic costs on a scale
sufficient to ignore the moral hazard in the future.”).
42
Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multi-Sectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 319, 332–36 (1999) [hereinafter Jackson, Regulation]; see also
HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 6–7 (1999). Risk management is a central, but not the only driver of regulation.
Considerations of equity and political economy, as well as historical accident, help shape regulatory
design, for example, to prevent concentration of political power, or give historically disadvantaged
groups access to credit. Jackson, Regulation, supra at 336–39.
43
Jackson, Regulation, supra note 42, at 332–36.
44
See generally GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf [hereafter G-30
REPORT]; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008) available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereafter
TREASURY BLUEPRINT]; Ben S. Bernanke, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Speech at the
Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20090310a.htm; Borio, supra note 24.
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45

institution or consumer. It is regulation geared to minimizing the risk of
and damage from systemic financial crises. Unlike conventional (microprudential) regulation, macro-prudential regulation is countercyclical:
stricter in good times, looser in bad. 46 Like containment, it is concerned
with the scope and transmission of financial shocks. Unlike containment,
it seeks to preempt transmission through ex-ante system design.
The macro-prudential approach shares the essential priorities of
regulation, namely, the emphasis on changing the incentives and structures
of the financial system to reduce its vulnerability far into the future.
Capacity for damage control comes second. In contrast, the essence of
containment is ex-post short-term damage control; it operates on existing
system architecture without aspiring to refashion it.
F

F

F

F

B. Containment and Prevention

13B

Crisis prevention straddles regulation and containment. The term is
widely used in popular, policy, and academic writing to include all
regulation to bolster financial stability. In this sense, most regulation—and
certainly all macro-prudential regulation—is also crisis prevention. In the
narrowest sense, prevention is government action at Kindleberger’s
mystical sweet spot after a shock has killed off the bad firms, but before it
has dragged down the good ones. 47 In his argument, this is the time to
deploy the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). The preceding Section
distinguished containment and regulation, including prevention in the
broad regulatory sense; this Section distinguishes containment and
prevention in the narrow sense.
One way to tease out the difference is by reference to the relationship
between insolvency and illiquidity. The classic function of LOLR—
F

45

F

This distinction is explicit in Borio, supra note 24; also it is implied in the TREASURY
BLUEPRINT, supra note 44, and the G-30 REPORT, supra note 44.
46
Borio, supra note 24, at 197. Forbearance—suspension of prudential strictures in crisis—is
commonplace in conventional regulation. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Controlling Systemic Risk in an
Era of Financial Consolidation in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 61 (2002, 2005). The recurrent demand for safety
valves in conventional regulation illustrates the dilemma. One well-known example is the systemic
risk exception for bank resolution, created under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, PL 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Prior to the enactment of FDICIA, FDIC was bound to use the least cost
method of bank resolution; the systemic risk exception allows the FDIC to bypass it if using the least
cost method “would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability” and if
bypassing the least cost method would “avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.” Id. For a discussion
of the exception, see Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Remarks at the international
Association of Deposit Insurers Symposium on Deposit insurance Cross Border Issues (May 3, 2007),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spmay0307.html. For a
more recent example, see, for example, Floyd Norris, Banks Get New Leeway in Valuing Their Assets,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at B1 (detailing the Financial Accounting Standards Board's move to relax
"mark-to-market" accounting requirements for banks in financial crisis).
47
See supra note 27 and the accompanying text.
HH
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unlimited short-term lending to banks at high interest on good collateral to
overcome temporary illiquidity 48 —seeks to prevent a liquidity shock from
becoming a solvency crisis. Illiquidity presumes no fundamental economic
problem, only a loss of confidence. Economic losses—along with their
distribution, and the associated politics—are completely avoidable by
confidence-boosting liquidity support. The LOLR also has an explicit role
ex-ante: confidence in the availability of public liquidity support, even
without any lending, should deter runs on solvent institutions. So that
healthy confidence does not become moral hazard (for example,
encouraging investment in insolvent firms effectively backed by the
public), the availability of LOLR support may be restricted subject to
official discretion, 49 and in exchange, may require regulatory oversight. 50
In contrast, containment starts from the presumption of economic loss.
The deployment of extraordinary measures in containment may “stop the
bleeding”, but it will not undo the injury.
A variation on the traditional view of the LOLR emerges from Steven
Schwarcz’s recent work on systemic risk. He proposes a market liquidity
provider of last resort (LPOLR) “to purchase securities in panicked
markets.” 51 Schwarcz frames it as a regulatory proposal for ex-ante risk
reduction. 52 Like the macro-prudentialists, he seeks to reduce risk to the
financial system broadly defined. 53 His proposal would preempt market
panics and limit damage from them 54 through a mix of traditional tools
such as circuit-breakers, disclosure, leverage caps and activity restrictions,
along with the LPOLR. 55 Like the traditional LOLR, it would help calm
F
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F

48

F

F

WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 57–64

(1906).
49

This is commonly referred to as “constructive ambiguity.”
Fred Hirsch, The Bagehot Problem, in Goodhart & Illing, supra note 23, at 187, 193.
51
Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 8 (Working
Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102326 [hereinafter,
Schwarcz, Markets].
52
Id. at 8; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 193, 205 et seq. Schwarcz notes the
possibility of ad hoc ex post approaches to systemic risk management; these stand in contrast to most
of the proposal. Id. at 230–31.
53
See supra note 45 (works on macro-prudential regulation). Schwarcz’s perspective has
antecedents in the legal literature. For example, Cynthia Lichtenstein described systemic risk as
encompassing risks presented by securities firms in 1993. Cf. Lichtenstein, supra note 21, at 141;
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 207, 210–14.
54
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 214; “Prevent” is used later in the text. Id. at 216.
55
Id. at 225–30. The distinction between Schwarcz’s proposal and the existing powers of the
Federal Reserve is relatively fine. Id. at 213 (distinguishing proposal by characterizing Fed lending as
limited to banks). In the Bear Stearns incident, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York used its
authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to buy assets, including securities, from a
nonbank using a special purpose vehicle; the same technique was used to support the insurance
company AIG several months later. MARKETS GROUP OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK,
DOMESTIC
OPEN
MARKET
OPERATIONS
DURING
2008
25–26
(2009)
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/omo2008.pdf. Using the same authority, the Federal Reserve
expanded its facilities to lend to all manner of nonbank institutions against a wide range of illiquid
assets; the stated goal, as in Schwarcz, is to boost market liquidity. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
50
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markets simply by standing ready to lend or buy assets when panic strikes.
Like the traditional LOLR, Schwarcz’s proposal addresses illiquidity, not
insolvency. The paradigmatic scenario involves no losses at all, since the
provision of liquidity restores normal market functioning. This in turn
makes it possible to frame both LPOLR and LOLR as apolitical: both save
the system (everyone), neither distributes within it. 56
Containment comes after prevention and preemption have failed to
bring the markets about; it presumptively entails losses; and it is inherently
political, if only because it must distribute such losses.
F

C. Containment and Resolution

14B

Policy, political science and economics writing often combine
discussion of crisis containment and resolution. Resolution refers broadly
to the restructuring and reregulation that happen in the aftermath of
financial collapse—after panic has abated, but before the economy has
returned to normal. 57 By then, the political system has come to terms with
the crisis, at least some losses have become apparent, and the actors have
F

F

Understanding the Recent Changes to Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision, http://www.
newyorkfed.org/markets/Understanding_Fed_Lending.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) Fed. Reserve
Bank of New York, Commercial Paper Funding Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
newyorkfed.org/markets/cpff_faq_081105.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). The distinction between
Schwarcz’s proposal and the general (though not the institution-specific) facilities is that the Fed only
lends against illiquid assets; technically, it does not buy them except through special-purpose vehicles.
However, lending and repurchase operations that put the assets on the Fed’s balance sheet for a long
time can be hard to distinguish from outright purchases. Section 13(3) allows Federal Reserve banks to
lend to nonbanks “in unusual and exigent circumstances” with the approval of a supermajority of its
governors and where credit is unavailable elsewhere. It was enacted in 1932 as part of a road
construction bill. Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, ch 520, § 210, 47 Stat. 715,
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 13(3) (2006)). President Hoover vetoed that bill’s predecessor, which put
expansive authority to lend to firms in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, citing recent corruption
scandals involving former RFC officials. Text of President’s Message Vetoing the Relief Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 12, 1932, at 2. Two weeks later, the Fed got expanded authority as a compromise; it
appears not to have used it between the Great Depression and the current crisis, although it came close
several times. See David Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph, The Region, The Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
Minneapolis
(Jun.
2008)
at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3485.
56
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 204, 226.
57
Honohan & Laeven, Introduction and Overview, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note
19, at 11; cf. Joan M. Nelson, Introduction: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Developing
Nations, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE THIRD
WORLD 3–4 (Joan M. Nelson ed., 1990):
The adjustment of individual nations usually comprises two distinct though
intertwined tasks. The first is stabilization; that is, reducing balance of payments
deficits and inflation to levels compatible with resumed and sustainable growth . . . .
The second aspect of adjustment is structural change designed to encourage foreign
exchange earning or saving activities, and more generally, to improve incentives and
efficiency for sustainable growth.
Containment in this Article is distinct from macroeconomic stabilization. Governments
use macroeconomic policy tools much more aggressively in crisis, but the difference from
ordinary times is one of degree. In contrast, wholesale restructuring and rewriting contracts is
a qualitative departure from non-crisis policymaking.
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begun to look to the future. The imperative is not to stop the bleeding, but
to rebuild:
The goal of resolution policy is to achieve the necessary
rebuilding of banks’ and borrowers’ balance sheets at the
lowest cost, where costs include costs from taxpayers’
transfers of wealth and the worsening of incentives in the
financial system. 58
F

Rebuilding must take account of past mistakes and design a new
system to avoid them. 59 This view of resolution shares a long-term focus
with regulation. But because resolution usually operates on a landscape of
economic and institutional wreckage, it can be both more backwardlooking (for example, compensating crisis victims and mitigating collateral
damage from containment) and more ambitious (for example, creating new
institutions and changing regulatory paradigms).
Containment relates to resolution in two ways: timing and causation.
Economists usually describe containment and resolution as successive
stages in managing a banking crisis. Containment seeks to stop the
outflow of money, whether in the form of deposit runs or capital flight;
where applicable, to stabilize the currency; to arrest asset stripping; and to
limit the collapse of asset prices. 60 Containment is a prerequisite to
resolution, and resolution is its necessary sequel. 61 But containment is also
a source of path dependence: policies adopted “in the heat of the crisis,”
such as regulatory forbearance, can prove sticky in the resolution phase 62
and can have “potentially irreversible” distribution consequences. 63
Because the writing on crisis resolution tends to be geared to policy
adoption, and because it is usually embedded in medium and long-term
policy reform agendas, it produces a particular view of containment. On
the one hand, containment is a source of costly, if necessary, departures
from non-crisis rules, 64 where cost is measured both in fiscal terms and in
terms of compromised incentives. 65 On the other hand, it is a window of
F

F
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F

F
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F

F

F

58
Charles W. Calomiris et al., Financial Crisis Policies and Resolution Mechanisms: A
Taxonomy from Cross-Country Experience in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 19, at 72.
59
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 37.
60
Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 6–11; Lindgren et al., supra note 7, at 16–23.
61
See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 17 (“No mater what the precise cause of the
crisis is, getting out of it almost always requires a combination of policy adjustment and emergency
financing, whether from an official loan or a restructuring of private debts. Policy adjustment . . .
[involves] steps to make the country a better long-term credit.”)
62
Calomiris et al., supra note 58, at 31.
63
Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 11; see also Lindgren, supra note 38, at 89 (“All [bank
closure] triggers must be designed to hold up legally, because interventions and closures will destroy
and redistribute private property and wealth and therefore have a high likelihood of being challenged in
courts.”).
64
See generally Lindgren, supra note 38.
65
Calomiris et al., supra note 58; Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 17; Lindgren et al., supra
note 7, at 29–45.
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opportunity to secure far-reaching changes in areas such as corporate
governance, bankruptcy, and foreign investment:
It is during the height of the crisis when the pain is felt
most that there is an opportunity to break established
malpractices and governance structures, to implement new
laws and regulations, and to find support for economic and
financial reforms. 66
F

In some cases, containment measures might simultaneously promote
resolution: for example, arresting a market panic may require an indication
of a near- or even medium-term policy path. But in the quotation above,
containment and resolution are joined strategically to achieve a policy
outcome that is politically impossible when nerves are calmer. Where the
outcome is good policy, this may be for the better, but it is not always good
policy, and the fog of crisis makes it hard to tell.
D. Containment and Emergency

15B

As already noted, contemporary U.S. law scholarship on financial
crises has been sparse until now, especially when compared with the
economics, political science, and economic history writing. 67 In search of
a legal perspective on financial crisis containment, I look also to the
scholarship on economic emergency.
Emergency response is a qualitatively different category from financial
regulation, prevention, and resolution. The last three comprise relatively
specific objectives and tasks to achieve them—for example, investor
protection may require suitability rules; preventing a bank run may require
deposit insurance and a LOLR; managing impaired assets on a large scale
may require an asset management company. In contrast, economic
emergency is a set of conditions, a state of the world claimed as a predicate
for extraordinary government action. Each instance of emergency
response is unique; neither the predicate nor the response may be specified
ex-ante. One way of looking at the discussion of containment in this
Article is as an effort to carve out that part of emergency response whose
operational content can be described in advance.
Lawyers have considered financial and economic emergency response
F

F

66
Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 17. This is a variant of the ubiquitous sentiment against
“wasting” a crisis, military or economic. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Obama’s Fear-Mongering, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/la-oe-goldberg102009mar10,1,7171121.column. Compare JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
52 (2003) (describing FDR’s use of popular support for fighting the banking crisis to reshape securities
regulation).
67
See supra notes 36, 37 and the accompanying text, and Levy, supra note 36, at 803–04 for a
similar complaint.
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occasionally from constitutional theory,
legal history, 69 and
70
comparative perspectives. Its economic policy content remains largely
unexplored in the law literature. Where economists detail a sequence of
bank closures, capital controls, payment standstills, emergency funding
and regulatory forbearance—noting all the while that “a clear and
transparent legal framework” for extraordinary measures is “essential” 71 —
lawyers delegate.
Part of the reason may be that the literature on economic emergency is
properly seen as a relatively small part of a much larger literature on
emergency response, most of which focuses on security. The central
question in legal writing is one of authority: who decides whether an
emergency exists, who decides the content of emergency measures, and
who or what might shape and cabin such emergency authority. 72 Concerns
about separation of powers and checks and balances loom large. Financial
crisis and economic policy specifics serve as background texture for much
more encompassing discussions about allocation of power. 73
The question of authority is crucial; I will return to it at the end of this
Article. For now, I suggest that it is difficult to answer the question “who
decides” how to respond to a financial crisis without a more granular and
systematic understanding of what they do 74 —the subject of the next two
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F
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F

F

F

F

See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 36, 255–64 (2002) (on the rise of executive power during the
Great Depression), Scheuerman, supra note 36, at 1882–92 (discussing Carl Schmitt’s theories of
executive power in economic emergency).
69
See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 36 (arguing for a legal regime for economic emergencies); Levy,
supra note 36 (examining judicial attitudes to finance through the prism of financial crises).
70
See, e.g., GROSS & NI AIOLAN, supra note 36, 76–79 (on the expansion of wartime powers to
economic exigency. The authors do not purport to address economic emergency comprehensively).
71
Lindgren, supra note 38, at 101.
72
This framing is clearest in Schmitt. See also Scheuerman, supra note 36, at 1871–91
(discussing economic crisis as a catalyst for reevaluation of authority as a means of governance).
73
See e.g., Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36, 15–16. The authors describe the Federal
Reserve’s effective purchase of AIG stock, which they suggest pushed the limits of the Fed’s authority
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (see supra note 55) in a singular fashion. They draw
parallels to Carl Schmitt’s ideas about emergency and the power of the Executive. AIG was one of a
species of heavily-lawyered transactions with precedents in the ongoing crisis (Bear Stearns used the
same special purpose vehicle structure under the same legal authority six months earlier), the crisis
response of the 1980s (see infra Part V.E, description of the Brady Plan) and the 1990s, to name a few.
Compare ROBERT E. RUBIN, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO
WASHINGTON 21-36, 219-223 (2004) (describing the unorthodox use of the U.S. Treasury’s Exchange
Stabilization Fund to support Mexico in 1995, and the subsequent Congressional restrictions on its use
during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998). The supermajority and exigency requirements in
Section 13(3) may have provided more ex-ante procedural protections than the other authorities.
FDICIA’s systemic risk exception (supra note 46) has a similarly elevated ex-ante threshold.
74
In a rare law article to integrate a substantive treatment of financial crisis economics with
theoretical perspectives on authority in a specific institutional setting, Daniel Tarullo suggests that
some tasks of international financial crisis management may present an intractable challenge for
allocating authority. Tarullo, supra note 36, at 613. Tarullo’s work responding to the financial crises
of the late 1990s also comes closer than most to addressing the substantive problem of containment.
He revisits the tradeoff between applying rules-systems and granting discretion to policy makers in an
international financial crisis, using IMF lending and sovereign bankruptcy as case studies, and
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Parts of this Article.
*****

3B

In sum, academic and policy approaches to financial crisis
management present a sporadic view of containment. For some, it is a
time-limited stage comprising a sequence of known technical tasks
designed to stop financial panics—a sequence that requires a firm and
transparent legal foundation. 75 For others, it is the response to a unique,
unpredictable cataclysm that entails suspending laws and delegating
power. In practice, until both officials and their constituents have owned
up to a crisis, containment measures are conflated with crisis prevention.
Once the crisis is acknowledged, policy prescriptions mix containment,
resolution, and regulatory reform. 76 Once normalcy returns, containment
policy often looks like a regrettable aberration. None of these treatments
generalize or explain the pattern of containment in recent crises. The next
Part is an effort to distil a core set of recurring decisions that comprise
containment. It is more general than most policy studies of crisis
management, but less so than most legal writing on economic emergency.
The goal is to help situate debates about authority and accountability in a
financial crisis setting.
F

F

F

F

IV. WHEN RULES DO NOT APPLY: THE CONTENT OF CONTAINMENT

4B

In his iconic history of financial crises, Kindleberger twice quotes this
passage from nineteenth-century banker and economist Thomas Joplin:
“There are times when rules and precedents cannot be broken; others when
they cannot be adhered to with safety.” 77 But as Kindleberger and those
who followed him have observed, emergency does not unleash chaos.
Instead, non-crisis rules give way to new habits.
The following sections explore three kinds of choices that
policymakers must make once they have determined they are facing a
financial crisis: whether to invoke wholesale solutions, whether to enforce
private contracts and government regulations, and how to distribute losses.
Although they often overlap, these choices address distinct containment
challenges.
F

F

highlighting the implications of the authority deficit in the international realm. He argues that some of
the rules proposals he critiques, if adopted, “may hinder efforts to contain a developing systemic
crisis,” id. at 630. Although Tarullo is clearly concerned about containment, his focus is not on
systematically defining the decision category and its implications. As his article’s title suggests, the
policy proposals and his critique go more to crisis prevention and reform of the international financial
system.
75
Lindgren, supra note 38, at 101.
76
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 37 (recommendations for economic recovery/crisis
management and financial regulatory reform/crisis prevention).
77
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 27, at 13, 197.
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A. Blanket or Bespoke

16B

A severe financial crisis necessarily raises the prospect of a wholesale
response. This is most obvious with traditional macroeconomic policy: a
shock may cause the authorities to raise or lower interest rates, adjust the
value of the currency (e.g., devaluation), or change the currency regime
altogether (e.g., dollarization)—measures that by definition target the
economy as a whole. It also holds for financial policy: bank holidays,
exchange controls, deposit freezes and comprehensive guarantees, are
containment staples. These have surfaced in economies ranging from
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States to Argentina, Russia
and South Korea. Less common across-the-board responses include
redenominating debt contracts, legislating debt relief, general exchange
rate subsidies, and injecting capital in the financial sector. In all cases,
wholesale financial measures are a departure from non-crisis norms.
Absent crisis, failure is resolved case-by-case. Outside bankruptcy,
contracts are enforced or renegotiated one-by-one. But even bankruptcy, a
collective proceeding, coordinates multiple creditors of a single debtor.
With a judge for every case, a plan for every firm, and a price for every
asset, bankruptcy overcomes collective action problems among creditors
that might otherwise race to the courthouse or dismember a viable
enterprise.
A large-scale financial crisis adds new constraints: collective action
problems appear across the economy, affecting both creditors and
debtors. 78 Asset prices collapse; courts and regulators are overwhelmed.
Such constraints may militate in favor of applying wholesale measures,
despite their bluntness, to broad categories of debtors and creditors. Four
factors drive the choice between wholesale and case-by-case measures in
containment.
First, speed is a key objective of containment policy: the goal is to jolt
the system into reversing course. A fast-moving crisis, such as a run, does
not allow time to design and implement solutions tailored to individual
persons’ or firms’ needs. Wholesale measures instantly signal that the
authorities see a system-wide problem, but also their intention to address it
forcefully and comprehensively.
Second, a crisis strains administrative capacity.
The capacity
challenge goes to scale as much as speed. In a run—or in the case of a
simultaneous shock such as a currency collapse—the non-crisis resolution
infrastructure cannot process an avalanche of failures. This constraint is
F

F

78
See, e.g., Aaron Tornell et al., NAFTA and Mexico’s Less-Than-Stellar Performance 22–23
(Nat’l Bureau for Econ. Research, Working Paper 10289, 2004) (discussing Mexico’s “cultura de no
pago” or “culture of non-payment” which followed its recent financial crisis. With little enforcement
from Mexican authorities, there was little incentive even for solvent debtors to make good on their
debts).
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relative: states with no resources and fragile institutions, such as Haiti, can
handle fewer cases at once than wealthy ones with established bankruptcy
and bank resolution systems, such as Sweden. But no ordinary system can
handle a 65% insolvency rate. Wholesale measures can relieve capacity
constraints through standardization, such as a limited menu of subsidies
and restructuring formulas, through new institutional arrangements such as
special courts or asset management companies to take over bad debts, or a
combination. In addition, while generalized regulatory forbearance is
rarely driven by the desire to lighten the load for bureaucrats, it can have
the side benefit of letting them focus scant resources on containment
priorities.
Third, a crisis can make valuation difficult to impossible. In normal
times, it makes sense to let the markets value individual contracts and to let
bankruptcy laws distinguish successful firms from ones that should fail.
Bankruptcy relies on both a credible threat of liquidation and the existence
of a plausible liquidation value. But the threat is not credible, and the
value meaningless, where over half of all firms are technically insolvent. 79
Extreme currency fluctuation may make it impossible for businesses to
plan and for markets to value: firms that look viable at Monday’s exchange
rate may look insolvent on Wednesday, then good again on Friday.
Complexity—in the form of financial engineering or opaque, convoluted
ownership structures—can compound the valuation problem. Replacing a
large number of individually negotiated contracts with fewer, simpler,
standardized ones can help the market value them, put a floor under falling
asset prices, improve liquidity and restore market mechanisms for later
restructuring.
Equitable and political considerations supply a fourth reason to choose
wholesale over case-by-case containment policy. For example, identical
treatment for different groups – such as foreign and domestic creditors—
can buy peace with important constituencies. Alternatively, securing
political support for crisis response may require wholesale measures that
discriminate among groups (taxing all CEOs, subsidizing all farmers).
Wholesale policies often look simple and transparent, but their economic
effect can diverge from the political signal: identical measures may affect
different groups differently. Compensation measures in the resolution
phase may redistribute containment subsidies. Defining target groups for
wholesale measures can have the effect of structuring crisis politics:
F

F

79
Marcus Miller and Joseph Stiglitz put it in terms of bankruptcy’s capacity to convey
information about the firm’s management and prospects. Where failure is system-wide, bankruptcy is
uninformative because failing to plan for an 80% devaluation and 100% interest rates is not normally a
sign of bad management. Marcus Miller & Joseph Stiglitz, Bankruptcy Protection Against
Macroeconomic Shocks: The Case for a ‘Super Chapter 11’ 2 (Centre for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation, 1999), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/keytopic/
global/milrstig.pdf.
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picking winners and losers, reshaping old coalitions.
Wholesale measures can be mandatory and punitive (for example,
capital controls) or voluntary and generous (capital infusions). All share a
defect: they are by definition over- and under-inclusive. Wholesale
measures will always leave worthy victims unhelped and will send scarce
resources to the undeserving, potentially encouraging others to gamble.
Such defects only recede against the imperatives outlined earlier—speed,
administrability, valuation, politics and equity.
B. Enforce, Suspend, Rewrite

17B

Debtors who run out of money typically have three choices: they may
negotiate with their creditors, default, or file for bankruptcy. Ordinarily,
governments enforce private contracts and punish default. Bankruptcy is a
standing mechanism for rewriting contracts outside crisis.
Suspending or rewriting private contracts in crisis addresses different
problems. The first reflects a difference of degree, discussed in the
preceding section: in a general downturn, there may simply be too many
defaults and insolvencies for the administrative apparatus to handle. The
second is a difference in kind. Even in a crisis, any given debtor and any
given creditor may be willing and able to carry on in their unamended
relationship. However, the performance of some contracts may have
spillover effects that exacerbate a crisis. 80 The presence of externalities
from performance may prompt government intervention.
Externalities are particularly apparent where a category of contracts—
or a contract clause that is boilerplate in a given market—poses a
macroeconomic threat. For example, an agreement to pay debts in scarce
hard currency, if it is widespread, can drain reserves. Pervasive indexation
of private contracts to foreign currency similarly can put pressure on
monetary and financial authorities. 81 Economists cite other sources of
contract rigidity, notably pervasive barriers to renegotiation, as a source of
vulnerability in crisis. 82
To address the first category of threats from private contract language,
governments may subsidize performance, amend the contracts by law or
decree, or refuse to enforce them. For the second category, subsidies are
not normally an option. But rewriting contracts is costly: it may make
future breach too easy (moral hazard), undermine commercial certainty, 83
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Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts, 82 U.S.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
81
See Guide et al., supra note 14, at 54. (Discussing hard currency indexation.) Indexation more
broadly is a means of risk-allocation; depending on the index, it may favor debtors or creditors.
82
EICHENGREEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 15-16, 34-36 (on the barriers to renegotiating sovereign
debt contracts).
83
See, e.g., Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n. v. Remington Paper & PowerCo., 139 N.E. 470,
471–72 (N.Y. 1923) (invoking the central importance of commercial certainty in contract law).
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and diminish faith in the rule of law. The possibility of government
intervention to rewrite contracts that had been unobjectionable when made
also introduces an element of sovereign risk. As one Argentine
commentator noted, rewriting contracts often not only undermines the
institution of contract, but also the credibility of the national legal
system. 84
A different but related set of concerns attends regulatory forbearance.
In normal times, governments enforce their laws and regulations. In crisis,
doing so may mean shutting down large portions of the economy and the
financial system. One central bank official told this author that enforcing
capital adequacy and loan provisioning requirements in crisis would have
meant taking over the private bankings system. 85 Although his description
may over-dramatize, regulatory forbearance in crisis is ubiquitous. 86 It is
most common with respect to capital adequacy, provisioning, and
regulatory accounting, which reflects respectively the pervasive capital
scarcity, bad loans and valuation difficulties that characterize a financial
crisis. Recognition that strict enforcement of micro-prudential rules can
severely exacerbate the effects of a crisis animates the design of macroprudential regulation.
Some of the established criticisms of regulatory forbearance echo the
concerns with rewriting private contracts. Suspending rules in crisis,
especially doing so often, makes rules less credible going forward. It
penalizes those who comply despite distress, and rewards those who break
the rules even when they could have complied. Like other containment
measures, regulatory forbearance may encourage risky behavior on the
assumption that rules prohibiting such behavior would not be enforced
when bets go bad.
Regulatory forbearance also raises distinct concerns from suspending
contract enforcement. First, it is hard to stop. Regulated entities develop a
vested interest in forbearance, and lobby hard to keep it going: it becomes
part of the business model. Perhaps more importantly, early forbearance
makes it possible for public and private actors to delay recognition of the
crisis, while prolonged forbearance makes it possible to delay
restructuring. Put differently, forbearance can work both as a crisis
response measure and as a means of denial. In the first instance, it creates
a breathing space for other response measures. In the second, it serves as
cover for channeling scarce resources to the regulated entities and their
creditors. The difference between the two uses of forbearance is often hard
to tell and politically determined.
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Spector, supra note 11, at 129.
Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Trip Report: Argentina, August 4–9, 2003 at 7 (Council on
Foreign Relations) (unpublished paper on file with author, Nov. 3, 2003).
86
Lindgren, supra note 38, at 89–92.
85
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C. Distribution

18B

In September 2007, days before he had to rescue Northern Rock and
guarantee the liabilities of the British banking system, Bank of England
Governor Mervyn King criticized other central banks for injecting money
into the market. He framed his criticism in terms of creditor moral hazard,
and warned that central bank actions could encourage creditors to gamble
in the expectation of being bailed out. 87 Shortly thereafter, the Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee argued that the U.S. Treasury’s limited
and voluntary mortgage modification initiative was sowing moral hazard
among irresponsible debtors. 88 This illustrates another containment
perennial: when doing nothing is not an option, policy makers trying to
contain a crisis must effectively decide whose moral hazard is worse—
from the start, they engage in distribution.
Debt restructuring and “bailouts” both distribute. Losses from
financial distress first fall on debtors and creditors. Debt reduction
mandates take away from creditors and give to debtors. Governmentfunded rescue operations shift loss from both debtors and creditors to the
taxpayers. Creditors can be some combination of bank depositors, bank
owners, and government-backed deposit insurance agencies. Where debt
takes the form of a marketable security (whether it started out that way or
was repackaged through securitization), creditors can be local pension
funds with long time horizons, foreign municipalities that count on the
income to maintain vital services, Italian retirees, Connecticut hedge funds,
or Wall Street investment banks. Similarly, debtors can be poor
homeowners or wealthy corporations. Each crisis will have its own
F
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See, e.g., Carol Douherty, British Central Bank Critical of Cash Infusions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2007; Mervyn King, Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central Banks Do? 7 (Draft
Opening Statement for Appearance before the Treasury Comm., Sept. 12, 2007), available at
http://media.ft.com/cms/a7ed52c2-6111-11dc-bf25-0000779fd2ac.pdf:
But, on the other hand, the provision of such liquidity support undermines the
efficient pricing of risk by providing ex post insurance for risky behaviour. That
encourages excessive risk-taking, and sows the seeds of a future financial crisis. So
central banks cannot sensibly entertain such operations merely to restore the status quo
ante. Rather, there must be strong grounds for believing that the absence of ex post
insurance would lead to economic costs on a scale sufficient to ignore the moral hazard in
the future. In this event, such operations would seek to ensure that the financial system
continues to function effectively.
Id.
88
Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee on Treasury Department’s Mortgage
Foreclosure Program 2 (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20071210_
ShadowStatement250.pdf:
The interest-rate freeze appears to reward borrowers who made bad decisions . . .
Additional problems of fairness and moral hazard are raised by wholesale adjustment of
investor and lender claims to interest-rate income under pre-existing mortgage contracts.
Rewriting mortgage contracts without open negotiations between servicers and investors
promises to discourage future investors from participating in markets for securitized
loans.
Id.
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constellation of constituents.
Distribution is politically, and often legally, fraught. It requires
officials to choose among constituents, many of whom wear multiple hats
at once: homeowners, depositors, retirees, shareholders, and investment
bankers, to name a few. It may require imposing new taxes, breaking
contracts and taking property.
In contrast, framing crisis response decisions in terms of loss limitation
puts decision makers above the political fray. This can be done in two
ways. First, if the crisis is one of temporary illiquidity, there should be no
losses and no need to spread the pain. As noted earlier, the LOLR
advances funds to solvent institutions and expects to be repaid forthwith. 89
Second, even in a solvency crisis that entails losses, supporting some
constituents over others may help limit overall social cost. In this view,
banks and households are vehicles, not objects of intervention. 90 A bank
looks like a better vehicle than a household, because a bank failure can
bring down many firms and households. Helping banks helps everyone at
once and no one in particular.
Where the problem is insolvency, masking distribution in these ways
can be costly. First, it may delay recognition of a crisis and crisis
response, which can magnify aggregate losses. Second, it may reduce
accountability. The liquidity-solvency paradigm reinforces the view that
financial crisis containment decisions, while urgent and complex, are
essentially technical: it creates the illusion of a hard boundary accessible
with scientific precision. But judgments about liquidity and solvency are
often wrong or fudged, and virtually always contested and political. 91 If a
crisis is mislabeled, the public may be stuck with losses from failed
liquidity support where other distribution options might have been chosen
up front.
Third, once the decision is made to shift some losses to the public,
choices about who gets scarce rescue resources and who is left to fail
require legitimacy in their own right. This is so even when such choices–
like triage in battlefield medicine–are easy to justify as limiting aggregate
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BAGEHOT, supra note 48, at 57–64.
RUBIN, supra note 73, at 19:
I tried to explain that I wouldn’t spend a nickel of taxpayer money for the sake of
rescuing investors. Again and again, I returned to my arguments that our proposal to
help Mexico was driven by our national interest. These numbers are always hard to
calculate, but we made a rough judgment about the potential costs of a prolonged
Mexican crisis to the United States—700,000 jobs affected, a 30 percent increase in
illegal immigration, and so on.

Id.
91
See Goodhart & Illing, supra note 23, at 13, 16 (summarizing contributions on the subject), and
infra Part II.B.
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losses. They are not always easy to justify; and measures that are
perceived as illegitimate may ultimately fail for lack of political support.
F

F

*****

5B

The description of containment so far raises a number of questions for
crisis response. I collect these here before proceeding to the case studies in
Part V. First, if the decisions about wholesale measures, enforcing
contracts and regulations, and loss distribution are inevitable, how should
policy makers go about making them? What factors should they consider
in each case? What legal and institutional features might make for better,
or at least for easier, containment decisions? Second, how should the law
allocate authority over containment policy? What should be the respective
roles of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches—but also of
independent agencies, most importantly central banks, and foreign actors,
public and private? Third, does isolating containment as a category help
determine the timing of emergency response? The accounts below suggest
some partial answers.
V. CONTAINMENT IN PRACTICE

6B

This Part examines how the three kinds of crisis containment decisions
have played out in very different economic and political settings: Indonesia
in 1997–1998, Japan in 1994–1998, the United States in 1933, Argentina in
2001–2002, and Mexico in 1982. All five examples involved bad loans
and widespread distress in the banking sector. But the five crises had
different causes and developed in different ways. In Mexico and
Argentina, government debt was a key source of distress. In the United
States, government debt was involved, but it was not central to the crisis.
In Japan and Indonesia, financial stress was most severe in the corporate
and banking sectors. Mexico offered an odd twist: its government debt
problems also threatened the banking sector in the United States. A period
of falling real estate prices was key to Japan’s collapse; fast-moving
currency crises defined Argentina’s and Indonesia’s.
For all the
differences, governments in each case faced the containment decisions
described in Part IV, even though not all were acknowledged as such. Yet
each government’s choices reflected a specific institutional and political
context.

92

Medical triage involves dividing the injured into three groups to conserve scarce rescue
resources: priority goes to the borderline cases that might survive with treatment, but would perish
without it. The lightly and terminally injured alike must wait.
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A. Indonesia 1997-1998

19B

Between July 1997 and January 1998, Indonesia’s currency, the
rupiah, fell by over 75% as international investors fled Asia. 93 In less than
a year, the financial crisis would end President Suharto’s thirty-two year
dictatorship. At the height of the crisis, 80% of all Indonesian firms were
illiquid and 65% were technically insolvent, unable to repay foreigncurrency debts. 94
At least three-quarters of all bank loans were
nonperforming. 95
Still reeling from having to rescue Korean banks, 96 some international
officials had a radical idea: why not swap all corporate debt in Indonesia
into equity overnight? This would achieve a conventional bankruptcy
result—handing insolvent firms over to their creditors—without getting
bogged down in Indonesia’s notoriously ineffectual bankruptcy system,
and might just work fast enough to arrest the downward slide. Even by
crisis standards, the blanket swap was an extreme idea; it was promptly
rejected after a few policy brainstorms.
Under another proposal, later described in a theoretical paper by
Marcus Miller and Joseph Stiglitz, Indonesia’s currency collapse would
have triggered across-the-board corporate debt reduction. 97 In Miller and
Stiglitz’s “Super Chapter 11,” general debt relief is appropriate in response
to macroeconomic shock because individual managers are not to blame for
pervasive insolvency, and because the skills of the existing managerial
cadre are essential to rehabilitate the corporate sector.
The instant swap and Super Chapter 11 came from very different
diagnoses of the crisis, and, if implemented, would have led to polar
opposite outcomes: a swap would expropriate, while debt relief would
entrench, the existing owners. But both proposals contemplated the
F
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INT’L MONETARY FUND, INDONESIA: STATISTICAL APPENDIX 42 tbl.39 (May 1999), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/1999/cr9939.pdf. See generally Barry Eichengreen, The
Asian Crisis After Ten Years, Keynote Address at Singapore Centre for Applied and Policy Economics
at Singapore National University 5 (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/
~eichengr/sing_keynote.pdf; Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The East Asian Financial Crisis:
Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1–2 (1998) (attributing the
crisis in part to investor behavior).
94
The exchange rate plunge quadrupled the rupiah value of their dollar debt. Conservative
estimates of private sector debt topped $72 billion, over 70% of Indonesia’s GDP. LEONARDO
MARTINEZ-DIAZ, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 226 n.42 (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author);
RICHARD ROBISON & VEDI R. HADIZ, REORGANIZING POWER IN INDONESIA: THE POLITICS OF
OLIGARCHY IN AN AGE OF MARKETS 153 (2004); Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Concludes Article IV
Consultation with Indonesia, 1999 PUB. INFO. NOTICE NO. 99/33.
95
ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94 at 154.
96
See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing the Korean government’s guarantee of
Korean bank liabilities).
97
Miller & Stiglitz, supra note 79. See also JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 57–64 (2002); Joseph Stiglitz, The Insider, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000, at 56,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPB File. At the time of the proposal, Stiglitz was Chief
Economist of the World Bank.
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restructuring of private contracts on an economy-wide scale. In 1997–
1998, such blanket measures seemed sensible considering the rapid spread
of Indonesia’s crisis and the wild currency fluctuations, which made
valuation nearly impossible. Institutional factors, such as the complex web
of corporate conglomerates, corrupt courts and an unused bankruptcy law
from Dutch colonial days compounded the containment challenge.
These elements, which argued in favor of an expansive wholesale
response, weighed against powerful countervailing considerations. When
the crisis hit, fifteen families, all but one of Chinese descent, controlled
over 60% of the stock market capitalization. Suharto’s family controlled
nearly 17%. 98 These were the principal debtors whose unhedged foreign
borrowing made the country so vulnerable.
With such extreme
concentrations of ownership and debt, a wholesale debt-equity swap would
have expropriated the ethnic Chinese elite on a revolutionary scale, most
likely in favor of foreign investors. On the other hand, across-the-board
debt forgiveness under “Super Chapter 11” would have visibly rescued the
same ethnic elites facing a backlash from the native Indonesian majority. 99
Similar distribution concerns were present, albeit less stark, in more
conventional containment policy options mooted in Indonesia. For
example, some had suggested imposing general restrictions on capital
outflows. These were unacceptable to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), whose views came with billions of dollars in emergency lending,
but also to the elites rushing to get money out of Indonesia. 100 Blanket
deposit guarantees similarly faced resistance as bank runs spread in the fall
of 1997. Indonesian technocrats and IMF officials opposed such
guarantees for fear of moral hazard, but also because they did not want to
appear to reward the elites whose banks had been funneling dubious loans
to connected firms. 101
Absent good distribution options, officials lapsed into policy paralysis
and incrementalism. In October of 1997, the government agreed with the
IMF to shut down sixteen out of over 200 banks, and to extend a partial
guarantee to small deposits. Designed to include banks owned by
Suharto’s family and associates, the narrowly targeted closing was meant
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STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL. EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS: HEROES OR VILLAINS? 13–14, tbl.8
(1999); Hugh Patrick, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Financial Crisis: Experience of
East Asian Countries 16 (Dec. 11, 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with Columbia Business
School), www.kdic.or.kr/english/down/2001_I_2(Session1).doc.
99
Similar concerns surfaced in connection with a proposal to establish a currency board, fixing
the value of the rupiah: international officials suspected among other things that Suharto and his cronies
would set the value artificially low and spirit the remaining dollars out of the country. BLUSTEIN,
supra note 6, at 225.
100
BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 85–115
101
This also reflected residual hope that the crisis was not entirely systemic, and that confidence
could return with closing the right subset of bad banks. Id. at 111. For further information regarding
connected lending, see MARTINEZ-DIAZ, supra note 94, at 190.
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to signal both the government’s seriousness and the discreet nature of the
crisis. 102 It backfired badly: Suharto’s son got his bank back within days
of closing; confusing announcements suggested (correctly) that more banks
were at risk; and the partial guarantee did nothing for large depositors who
made up most of the deposit base by value. 103
In the interim, central bank lending continued in force. Like the
rejected options, this ostensible liquidity support had the effect of bailing
out the best-connected. For the government it may have had the added
virtues of being discretionary and less obvious to the public eye than
blanket guarantees or moratoria. Better yet, the authorities’ heavy reliance
on central bank lending allowed everyone to avoid admitting that Indonesia
was in the middle of a nasty solvency crisis. A few months later, when the
grim reality settled in, the state issued a full guarantee of all bank
liabilities. By then, the capital had decamped for Singapore. 104
The next round of measures, launched in January 1998 along with the
guarantee, tried to straddle containment and resolution. Coming at the
lowest point in rupiah’s slide, it aimed to arrest it—but not at the cost of
bailing out the undeserving. The centerpiece of the emergency package
was an asset management company, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency (IBRA). The agency’s mission was all-encompassing: taking over
bad banks, restructuring and selling their assets, and recovering as much as
possible of the central bank liquidity support dispensed in the preceding
months. Meant to boost market confidence, IBRA took months to sort out
its mandate, management, and authority, all in the public eye. It then
embarked on a multi-step process of taking over and culling banks,
assuming portfolios, and negotiating individual restructuring arrangements.
Initially, it had no authority to reduce debt or foreclose on collateral.
IBRA eventually came to control assets worth over one-third the size of
Indonesia’s economy. In its capacity as “the chief arbiter of . . . a massive
redistribution of corporate assets,” IBRA became a major political force in
its own right. 105
A year into the crisis, bank resolution costs stood at 51% of
Indonesia’s GDP 106 and much of the economy was in state hands. With
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See Lindgren et al., supra note 7, at 2.
BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 112; see also ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94, at 156 (noting that
Suharto expected the announcement of the IMF to restore confidence in the financial system, which it
ultimately did not).
104
INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, EVALUATION REPORT: THE IMF AND
RECENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES 13–15 (2003) available at http://www.imfieo.org/eval/complete/pdf/07282003/all.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATION REPORT].
105
See ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94 at 197 (noting that by mid-1999, the IBRA controlled
assets amounting to 546 trillion rupiah); Wayne Arnold, Indonesian Bank Agency Fading Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at W3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting that the IBRA
recouped 146 trillion rupiah of the 650 trillion spent on rebuilding the Indonesian banking system).
106
See Lindgren et al., supra note 7, at 165.
103
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Suharto out of power and many of his associates out of sight, asset sales
remained mired in political controversy. 107 The new government rejected
demands to hand over IBRA’s holdings to native Indonesians, but also
barred sales to the old, mostly Chinese, owners. Western investors
remained unpopular; however, the state’s dire fiscal predicament prompted
further opening to foreign capital, notably in the banking sector. It took
years and much maneuvering to bring a mix of old and new capital back to
Indonesia, 108 with the state absorbing losses many times the size of the
original corporate liabilities.
It is customary to blame Indonesia’s crisis response on the dysfunction
of a dying dictatorship and the dogmatism of international officials. 109
Both are likely at fault. But Indonesia’s choices, while extreme, are not
unique. Politicians and technocrats everywhere recoil at drastic wholesale
response to crisis, then come to embrace it after costly bespoke measures
fail to stop the collapse. Politicians hate to admit to large-scale failure;
technocrats resent the moral hazard and inequity inherent in across-theboard response. And few policy makers have the stomach to preside over
revolutionary redistribution.
Indonesia’s case was notable in yet another respect. From the start,
even before the government had acknowledged the full depth and breadth
of the crisis, domestic and international policy makers saw distress as an
opportunity to secure far-reaching structural reforms of the Indonesian
economy. While the dynamic itself is quite common, the depth of
Indonesia’s crisis and the breadth of the reform ambition were impressive.
IMF and World Bank lending conditions, many developed with the quiet
support of technocrats within the Indonesian government, 110 among other
things sought to break up industrial and trading monopolies, privatize state
enterprises, open the financial sector to foreign participation, revamp the
bankruptcy regime and clean up the courts. Although the reform agenda
might have been reasonable as a matter of economic policy, in retrospect, it
is harder to justify as crisis management. Foreign and domestic actors
were quite open about their desire to use the crisis as a window of policy
opportunity, and they were right—perhaps to a greater degree than anyone
had expected. 111 Yet the muscular push for reforms, some of which had
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Arnold, supra note 105 (noting that the IBRA was viewed as an agency that would reform the
banking system following Suharto’s exit from power).
108
See ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94, at 191–92 (noting that while IBRA was established in
1997 to work toward recapitalizing Indonesian banks, by 2001 Indonesian banks were still struggling);
see also Patrick, supra note 98, at 16 (noting that violence in Indonesia in 1998 contributed to the flight
of Indonesian capital).
109
BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 110–11; EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 104, at 13–15; Radelet
& Sachs, supra note 93, at 1; Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 56.
110
MARTINEZ-DIAZ, supra note 94, at 195.
111
Id. at 218 (describing President Habibie’s reluctant embrace of IMF program conditionality,
including trade openness, as a way out of the crisis even as it was contrary to his own nationalist
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less-than-obvious payoff in arresting the crisis, cost domestic and
international policy makers enormous political capital.
Indonesia offers one of the starkest illustrations of containment
decision-making and its extreme distributional consequences. Perhaps
because the distribution stakes were so high, the default option—avoiding
wholesale restructuring for as long as possible, quietly supporting
entrenched interests with forbearance and central bank lending, all the
while shifting losses onto the general public—carried the day.
B. Japan 1994–1998

20B

Japanese banks were among the largest creditors to bankrupt
Indonesian companies. Apart from that, the two crises had little in
common. Indonesia was poor; Japan was rich. Indonesia had deep ethnic
divisions compounded by extreme inequality; Japan had some of the
lowest levels of wealth and income inequality in the industrial world. 112
Indonesia was an oligarchic dictatorship; Japan a democracy, albeit one
where a single party had dominated the political scene for decades.
Indonesia suffered a sudden currency collapse; Japan’s economy unraveled
over a decade. Unlike Indonesia, Japan had ample financial, technical and
institutional capacity. Yet the two governments made some similar
decisions about crisis containment. Through most of Japan’s “lost
decade,” its authorities approached institutional failure case-by-case,
practiced regulatory forbearance, and insisted on scrupulous performance
of private contracts. Perversely, this approach resulted in a wholesale
rescue of the financial system, and at least in the first instance, a largescale loss transfer from banks and their borrowers to the public.
Japan entered the 1990s with a burst real estate bubble and a stock
market that had dropped over half its value. The height of the bubble in
the late 1980s coincided with capital markets deregulation, which made it
easier for the largest Japanese manufacturing firms to issue securities, and
sent Japanese banks to scramble for new borrowers. Loans to small and
medium-size firms, to real estate and finance companies, and to
individuals, grew rapidly. 113 A large portion of these loans was directly
and indirectly secured by real estate. Historically, real estate had been the
dominant form of collateral for bank lending in Japan. As a result, many
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preferences). The most extreme “reform” was political—the end of Suharto’s dictatorship. Although
many saw the crisis and the ensuing reform conditionality as part of a Western plot to overthrow the
President, such charges remain the province of conspiracy theories.
112
See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and
International Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 204 (2006) (describing the far lower levels of
wealth and income inequality in post-war Japan than in the United States).
113
Yoshinori Shimizu, Convoy Regulation, Bank Management, and the Financial Crisis in Japan,
in JAPAN’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE 57, 61–71 (Ryoichi Mikitani &
Adam S. Posen eds., 2000).
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loans went bad when land prices fell by more than two-thirds at the turn of
the decade. 114 But the damage was hidden, as the government encouraged
banks to recycle the loans and paper over losses while waiting for a
recovery that did not come. 115
Commentators often date the start of the financial crisis to 1994 and
the near-failure of two urban credit cooperatives. Contrary to crisis
stereotype of falling giants, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen were small deposittaking institutions of the sort that lent locally to families and small
businesses. 116 Bad real estate loans put the two in such bad shape that
even their notoriously lax municipal regulators recommended shutting
them down. Instead, they were rescued with financial support from other
banks and contributions from the local and national governments. This
was the first time since World War II that Japan used public funds to bail
out a financial institution, and the first in a series of ad-hoc rescues that
soon covered the entire financial system.
Over the next four years, failures spread to housing lenders, banks big
and small, and global securities houses. In November 1997, nearly every
week brought news of financial collapse—including the bankruptcy of
Yamaichi Securities that began this article. 117 The inflection point came in
1998 with the failure of Long Term Credit Bank (“LTCB,”) once the ninth
largest in the world by asset size, 118 followed by a spate of more
comprehensive legislation, including an asset management scheme in
1999.
The government’s response between 1994 and 1998—continued
regulatory forbearance, central bank liquidity support and “voluntary”
contributions from solvent banks to meet the contractual obligations of the
failing—signaled that the troubles were limited and temporary, even as
many policy makers knew they were not. Each failure exposed new gaps
in the resolution infrastructure and each rescue package appeared to be
jimmy-rigged to make up for these gaps. After a while some of the
features, such as the private bank contributions—or hougachou (a term
also used to describe village collections for religious feasts) 119 —became
fixtures of Japan’s crisis response.
Fiscal contributions remained
immensely controversial. As a result, last-resort lending during that period
turned conventional central banking principles upside down: one finance
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Id. at 60, 64, 70–71, 74. Banks also indirectly backed long-term capital market financing.
Most bank and capital market financing was effectively secured. Id.
115
Id. at 77.
116
NAKASO, supra note 5, at 4; TETT, supra note 4, at 72; Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Bank Failures in Mature Economies, 13 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 7 (2004),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp13.pdf?noframes=1.
117
NAKASO, supra note 5, at 8.
118
TETT, supra note 4, at xxiii. When it failed, LTCB had $240 billion in assets. NAKASO, supra
note 5, at 12.
119
NAKASO, supra note 5, at 5.
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ministry official observed in retrospect that most Bank of Japan (“BOJ”)
support went to failed institutions, not temporarily illiquid ones. 120
Just before the rescue of the credit cooperatives in 1994, the Central
Bank Governor had assured the public that BOJ funds would not be used to
bail out failed firms, but only to maintain financial stability. 121 In practice,
the government appears to have seen the latter as a function of the former:
any failure was a threat to stability. Often-cited institutional factors
provide only part of the explanation.
Japanese banks and their customers had been linked for decades, some
longer, in an elaborate pattern of cross-shareholding. 122 By some counts,
over half of all public companies’ shares could be found in the hands of
their banks, their customers, and related firms; a relatively small
percentage of all shares traded publicly in practice. 123 Although ownership
links were common in the corporate sector and not limited to public
companies, they were especially strong among financial firms: in the early
1990s, banks’ largest equity holdings were overwhelmingly in other
financial institutions. 124
The avowed purpose of cross-shareholding was to foster stability.
Stability in turn had several dimensions. First, it could be a vehicle for
promoting financial stability through access to credit, a form of mutual
assistance. Second, it was justified as a way of warding off hostile
takeovers. Third, cross-shareholding was a means of commitment: it
fostered long-term business dealings and reinforced existing contractual
links, for example, between suppliers and their customers, or banks and
their borrowers. 125
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Id. at 22.
Id. at 5.
122
For a more in-depth discussion of Japanese cross-shareholding, see generally J. Mark
Ramseyer, Cross Shareholding in the Japanese Keiretsu (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for
Law, Econ. and Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 244, 1998), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=harvard/olin (explaining the functions
and purpose of the Japanese keiretsu); U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs [DESA], Bank-firm Crossshareholding in Japan: What Is It, Why Does It Matter, Is It Winding Down?, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/1999/DP.15 (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter DESA Discussion Paper] (prepared by Mark Scher),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2001/esa01dp15.pdf (examining the development of
cross-shareholding involving Japan’s commercial banks, and the problems accompanying the practice).
Cross-shareholding has roots in the history of Japanese corporate organization; however, it evolved and
adapted in response to legal reform and foreign investment after World War II. See, e.g., Scher, supra,
at 4–5 (explaining the evolution of cross-shareholding from World War II through the 1990s).
123
See DESA Discussion Paper, supra note 122, at 1–2 (citing 65–70% as the level of “quiescent
stable shareholding” in publicly traded firms). Hugh Patrick cites a lower percentage than Scher, but
still above 50% for financial firms in the 1980s and 1990s. Patrick, supra note 98, at 10–12.
124
Patrick, supra note 98, at 11; DESA Discussion Paper, supra note 122, at 15 (“Fifteen out of
the top sixteen companies in which city, regional and long-term credit banks held shares were in fact
other financial institutions . . . .”).
125
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 96–99, 318–319 (Alan Bird,
ed., 2001) (defining and explaining “cross-shareholdings” and “mochiai”); Japan Economic Planning
Agency, White Paper: Economic Survey of Japan, (1991–1992) 180–181 (1992); see also Ramseyer,
supra note 122, at 16–17, 19–20 (discussing cross-shareholding in supplier relationships).
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The functions and efficacy of cross-shareholding and other linkages
among Japanese firms are debated in a large literature. 126 For purposes of
this case study, cross-shareholding is interesting as a variant of
interconnectedness that affects crisis management in many countries. In
Japan, the practice of cross-shareholding, along with the financial and
other business relationships it sought to bolster, appeared to make it more
difficult for the system to countenance individual failure, to encourage
continued lending to weak firms, 127 and to make financial institutions
generally more prone to peer and government pressure to maintain
confidence. 128 Cross-shareholding was far from the only means of
interconnectedness or the most important barrier to individual failure in
Japan, yet it offers an especially stark illustration of the predicament.
The commitment device seemed to work as designed. Quite apart
from any “soft” rescue norm, the “hard” contractual and ownership links
helped transmit individual failure far and wide. 129
Private sector
executives described themselves as bound by a public duty to maintain
confidence in the face of cascading bad news. Thus the head of LTCB
explained his decision to pay dividends while the bank was insolvent as a
matter of protecting the system. If he failed to pay, he would be
responsible for bringing down other banks, firms and perhaps the economy
as a whole. 130 But even where failure could not be avoided—as in the
Yamaichi bankruptcy and the ultimate nationalization and sale of LTCB—
the government scrupulously paid up on the firms’ contracts, for fear that
interconnectedness would bring down others and further disrupt the
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See, e.g., Masahiro Aoki et al., The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in
THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING
ECONOMIES (Masahiro Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., 1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial
Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 872, 874–75 (1993) (discussing the purpose and functions of the
Japanese keiretsu); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401, 403–04 (2002) [hereinafter The
Myth of the Main Bank] (discussing the role of the “main bank” in Japanese keiretsu groups); Yoshiro
Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter? The Myth of the Japanese Main Bank,
2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 285–97 (2005) [hereinafter Does Relationship Banking Matter?]
(arguing that the main bank “insurance” function is a fiction); see also DESA Discussion Paper, supra
note 122, at 10(citing to interviews with Japanese bankers).
127
Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Crisis Resolution and Credit Allocation: The Case of Japan, in
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES 305 (Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005).
128
Patrick writes more broadly about the challenge of overcoming “embedded relationships” in
crisis. Patrick, supra note 98, at 22–24; see also generally NAKASO, supra note 5; TETT, supra note 4
(citing examples of contractual and ownership links between LTCB and real estate clients as crisis
transmission mechanisms and policy constraints).
129
TETT, supra note 4, at 59, 87, 105; Patrick, supra note 98, at 22–24 (discussing “embedded
relationships). It seems fitting that the bookends of Japan’s slow-motion financial collapse—the failure
of two credit cooperatives in 1994 and of LTCB in 1998—were connected. LTCB had an undisclosed
equity stake in Tokyo Kyowa; all three also shared a big client, a real estate company that ultimately
destroyed them all. TETT, supra note 4, at 72–73.
130
TETT, supra note 4, at 112.
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131

markets.
In the background, forbearance permeated the regulatory fabric.
Senior officials expected to assume high posts with commercial banks
upon retiring from public service. 132 Leading up to the crisis, financial
sector and official actors understood the prevailing “convoy regulation”
system as a way for the government to ensure the survival of even the
weakest banks; the banks in turn accommodated government lending
priorities. 133 In crisis, the government supported “flexible” accounting and
coordinated “voluntary” rescues among regulated institutions.
In sum, Japan was in a peculiar position of resisting comprehensive
crisis response where single-firm failure was seen as a threat to the system
in financial and political terms. This resulted in ad-hoc, case-by-case
rescues that added up to a wholesale bailout of the financial sector. Those
that borrowed from Japanese banks at the height of the real estate bubble—
small and midsize firms that did not have access to the capital markets, real
estate and financial firms, and some individual borrowers 134 —appeared to
benefit disproportionately from the infusion of government money.
In Japan, as in many other crisis countries, banks were poorly
capitalized and underprovisioned; the deposit insurance and investor
protection funds were small and broke; and until 1998, the government had
limited power to take over and restructure failed institutions.
Interconnectedness and mutual assurance were presented, for a time, as an
effective substitute for capital cushions and public insurance. But just as
the most generous capital cushions and insurance schemes prove
inadequate in a severe crisis, mutual assurance—if it ever worked 135 —fails
when everyone is under water. It can also constrain crisis response: when
offered public recapitalization funds in early 1998, “all major banks . . .
applied for capital injection in order to avoid the risk of being singled out
as a weak bank,” 136 spreading thin the already limited support. What
might have been narrowly targeted measures became wholesale.
Japanese authorities are routinely accused of dawdling for a decade;
the social and political context gets blamed for slowing and muting the
crisis response. But viewed from another angle, Japan had a predictable
reaction to an ordinary predicament. For as long as officials believed that
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NAKASO, supra note 5, at 12–13.
The practice was called “descent from heaven.” Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Monetary &
Exchange Affairs Dep’t, Working Paper: The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and
Lessons, 26 n.47 (IMF Doc. WP/00/7 Jan. 2000) (prepared by Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0007.pdf.
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NAKASO, supra note 5, at 2, 17.
134
Shimizu, supra note 113, at 61–71.
135
Miwa & Ramseyer argue strongly that it never existed, at least in the “main bank” institution.
See generally The Myth of the Main Bank, supra note 126 (commenting that Masahiko Aoki’s “main
bank” theory does not accurately describe Japan).
136
NAKASO, supra note 5, at 12
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there was nothing they could do about the crisis, they had no reason to
acknowledge its true magnitude. 137
They resorted to regulatory
forbearance and measures meant to avoid losses, such as central bank
liquidity support and mutual assistance among banks. As more firms
teetered on the brink, the government adopted by default a policy of
rescuing everyone, and paid failed institutions to perform under financial
contracts that would have been breached without government help. This
increased the total magnitude of financial sector losses and progressively
shifted them onto the general public. More radical measures had to wait
for the political system to adjust to the magnitude of the crisis, which took
more and bigger failures and failed rescues.
F

F

C. United States 1933

21B

Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office more than three years after the
stock market crash, when the economy had shrunken by half, five thousand
banks had failed, states and companies printed scrip, and Mexican money
circulated in the United States. 138 In some industrial cities, over 70% of all
workers were unemployed. Farmers with pitchforks stormed courthouses
to block foreclosures. Lloyd’s of London sold riot insurance in
America. 139 Crisis denial was not an option.
Despite popular perception to the contrary, the Hoover Administration
had not stood idle since 1929. Towards the end of his term, Hoover
boosted federal construction, tried to raise agricultural prices, and sought
new funding for the mortgage market under the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act. He also preceded FDR in using military metaphor to fight economic
malaise.
In December 1931, Hoover proposed to establish the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, modeled after the War Finance
Corporation of World War I, to channel money to banks, municipalities
and railroads. 140 Yet the government response was generally limited to
voluntary programs, exhortations, and subsidies for intermediaries.
Hoover opposed outright mandates for banks and government relief
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See Adam S. Posen, Introduction: Financial Similarities and Monetary Differences, in
JAPAN’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 113, at 1, 7–10
(setting aside monetary policy and discussing how a policy of regulatory forbearance failed to contain
Japan’s financial crisis).
138
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 18, 42 (1963)
[hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT].
139
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY 1914–1932, at 247, 261–62 (1958)
[hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY].
140
The idea to revive the War Finance Corporation originally came from Federal Reserve
Chairman Eugene Meyer. James L. Butkiewicz, The Impact of a Lender of Last Resort During the
Great Depression: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 32 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON.
HIST. 197, 199 (1995). LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 257–58. Although RFC
support may have slowed the rate of failure among recipients, it did not spur net new lending, since the
banks had become risk-averse. Id.
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141

payments to individuals.
Instead, he tried to jawbone financial industry
captains over dinner and to shame them with Congressional probes. 142
Hoover also set up a vehicle for the strong banks to help the weak (they did
not). 143
States filled the void with mandates of their own. By the time of
Roosevelt’s inauguration, many had imposed foreclosure moratoria; nearly
all had some form of banking restrictions. 144
FDR’s inaugural address on March 4 was laced with war imagery and
broadsides against “money changers.” 145 On March 5, he used wartime
emergency powers to declare a national bank holiday. 146 In the words of
one historian, “[t]he very totality of the bank holiday helped snap the
tension the country had been under all winter.” 147 The same measure
banned transactions in gold as a first step to dollar devaluation. 148 News
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LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 252, 257–58; BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE
CRASH AND ITS AFTERMATH: A HISTORY OF SECURITEIS MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1929–
1933, 209–12 (1985).
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LEUCHTENBERG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 251–59; SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at 8–9,
11–13 (describing Hoover’s dinners with bankers and stock exchange officials and his role in launching
Senate Banking Committee hearings into Wall Street misdeeds).
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LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, 257–58; Butkiewicz, supra note 140, at 199
(describing, among other things, the establishment of the National Credit Corporation); cf. Robert F.
Bruner & Sean D. Carr, Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 1907, 19 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 115,
122 (2007) (describing the efforts of J.P. Morgan and other New York bankers to stop market panic in
1907 by backing weaker institutions); NAKASO, supra note 5, at 1, 10–11 (describing Japanese
government policies encouraging strong banks to rescue weak ones); Grace Wong, Wall Street
Superfund: Not So Super, CNNMONEY, Oct. 22, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/22/
markets/super_fund/index.htm (describing a U.S. Treasury Department effort to get banks to pool
resources to buy distressed financial assets, announced on October 15, 2007).
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BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 1919–1939, 329 (1996); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, 38–39, 42–43
(1963).
145
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1933), available at http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-inaugural/ [hereinafter Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s First Inaugural Address]; see Belknap, supra note 36, at 67–68 (describing the war
analogy).
146
Bank Holiday, March 6–9, 1933, Inclusive, Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689–91 (1933);
Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95 et
seq. (2000)); Belknap, supra note 36, at 73. Roosevelt approved the issuance of the proclamation on
the afternoon of Sunday, March 5. LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 42 (1963).
147
LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, 42 (1963).
148
Bank Holiday, March 6–9, 1933, Inclusive, Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689–91 (1933);
Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95
(2000)); Belknap, supra note 36, at 73. Roosevelt did not formally devalue until January 30, 1934,
after a series of interim legislative and executive measures. See Agricultural Adjustment Act, 73 Pub.
L. No. 10, 48 Stat 31 (1933) (giving the Executive discretion to inflate); Gold Reserve Act, 48 Stat. 337
(1934) (mandating a 40% minimum reduction in the gold value of the dollar). For a discussion of the
Administration’s gold buying program and other initiatives to promote commodity price inflation, see,
for example, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933–1935, 197–252
(1959); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 78–84 (1963); see also Kenneth W. Dam,
From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 504, 512–15 (1983).
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149

headlines warned of “Prison for Gold Hoarder.”
Legislation validating
the President’s actions and expanding his authority passed the Congress
“sight unseen” on March 9 in an atmosphere that evoked “great war
measures.” 150 Sticks joined words and carrots in the containment toolkit.
Roosevelt’s primary objective in delinking the dollar from gold was to
inflate agricultural commodity prices. 151 The move was also part of a
national recovery policy that sought to redistribute power away from New
York bankers to Western farmers and entrepreneurs; 152 it was moreover a
nationalist bid for policy autonomy amid the crumbling international gold
standard. 153 In the Administration’s way lay over $100 billion in face
value of government and private debt contracts that gave creditors the
option of payment in gold at the rates prevailing when the contract was
made. 154 Such “gold clauses” had become boilerplate after the last bout of
dollar devaluation following the Civil War; 155 by 1933, they were in over
half of all debt, totaling more than 130% of GDP. 156 The U.S. government
was the largest debtor affected, with $22 billion in gold clause debt in June
1933, followed by state and municipal governments at $14 billion,
railroads at $11 billion, $34 billion for other domestic corporations, and
$10 billion issued by foreign entities. 157
The clauses were designed as a hedge against precisely the sort of
move contemplated by FDR. 158 They were a policy problem because they
had become ubiquitous: 159 if they were enforced, public and private debt
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Use of Scrip Authorized: President Takes Steps Under Sweeping Law of War Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1933, at 1.
150
LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 43–44 (1963).
151
Id. at 48; see also Dam, supra note 148, at 511–13 (1983). For a contemporary perspective,
see Charles S. Collier, Gold Contracts and Currency Regulation, 23 CORNELL L. Q. 520, 528, 532
(1937–1938) (describing the Joint Resolution’s objective as “reflation of prices”).
152
SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 233.
153
See generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 35; SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 199–200, 221.
154
Gold Obligations Are $100,000,000,000; Federal Bonds Total $22,000,000,000, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1933, at 2; Randall S. Kroszner, Is it Better to Forgive than to Receive? An Empirical
Analysis of the Impact of Debt Repudiation 2, 6 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business), available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/
randall.kroszner/research/repudiation4.pdf. Some of the clauses were drafted to require payment in
gold; others permitted payment of the specified gold value in paper dollars. The second category
presented a more difficult problem for the government in later litigation.
155
Ignore Indenture Payable in Gold: Agents for Bonds with Coupons Due Fail to Give Coin
When Demand Is Made; Court Action Possible; Issues of French Municipalities Soar in Price on Offer
to Settle in Metal, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1933, at 2 (describing “the familiar clause”); Knox v. Lee and
Parker v. Davis (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. 457 (1871); see also Juilliard v. Greenman (Legal
Tender Case), 110 U.S. 421, 436, 449 (1884) (describing the post-Civil War acts passed by Congress to
address dollar devaluation); see Levy, supra note 36 (discussing the Legal Tender Cases).
156
Dam, supra note 148, at 523 (citing 55% of all debt); Kroszner, supra note 155 (citing twothirds).
157
Gold Obligations Are $100,000,000,000; Federal Bonds Total $22,000,000,000, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1933, at 2; Kroszner, supra note 154, at 2.
158
Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 302 (1935); John P. Dawson, The Gold
Clause Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REV. 647, 662–63 (1934–1935); Dam, supra note 148, at 522–23.
159
Text of the Two Reports on the Gold Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at 2:
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stock would rise by as much as 69% when the dollar fell against gold,
triggering mass bankruptcy. 160 On June 5, Congress passed and Roosevelt
signed a Joint Resolution that made gold clauses in public and private debt
unenforceable as against public policy. 161 It was rushed through to allow
the Treasury to issue new debt without the clauses on June 15. 162
Commodities rallied briefly; 163 creditors sued.
The first federal ruling came a year later when a district court in St.
Louis held that a railroad’s promise to pay in gold was no more
enforceable in the aftermath of the Joint Resolution than a promise to pay
“100 piculs of Chinese opium.” 164 Within months, four appeals were
joined before the Supreme Court: two suits on railroad bonds (including
the consolidated Missouri appeal), and two on U.S. government
obligations. 165
In all four cases, the creditors claimed due process and takings
violations; on the editorial pages, they pressed the image of a bank
depositor arbitrarily denied access to his money. 166 To the President and
his allies, they were “no better than racketeers” trying to finagle $1.69 for
their dollar. 167
For the Court, the private obligations presented the simplest
problem. 168 They plainly had to give way to Congress, since all those
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If the gold clause applied to a very limited number of contracts and security
issues, it would be a matter of no particular consequence, but in this country
virtually all obligations, almost as a matter of routine, contain the gold clause. In
light of … [pervasive gold hoarding and capital flight], … no currency system …
can meet the requirements of a situation in which many billions of dollars of
securities are expressed in a particular form of the circulating medium, particularly
when it is the medium upon which the entire credit and currency structure rests.
160
See, e.g., Kroszner, supra note 154, at 2.
161
H.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong., ch. 48, 48 Stat. 112 (1933). The operative portion read:
Resolved . . . That (a) every provision contained in or made with respect to any
obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a
particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States
measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no such provision
shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred.
Every obligation, heretofore or heareafter incurred, whether or not any such
provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon
payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is
legal tender for public and private debts. Any such provision contained in any law
authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States, is
hereby repealed . . . .
162
Roosevelt Signs Gold Clause Ban: Resolution, Rushed to Cover June 15 Federal Issue, Put
Into Effect Quickly; ‘Repudiation’ Is Denied, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1933, at 35.
163
SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 236.
164
In re Missouri Pacific R. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1, 9 (E.D. Mo. 1934); Court Knocks Out Bond Gold
Clause, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1934, at 1.
165
Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. and United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240
(1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
166
Norman C. Norman, Our Gold Certificates, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1933.
167
ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 256 (1960).
168
Seth P. Waxman, The Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2416
(2000) (arguing that the private contracts cases were the easiest of the Gold Clause lot). For a similar
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subject to “national power”—including private parties, states and
municipalities—contracted subject to the Congress’s powers to regulate
commerce, and certainly to establish the value of money. Chief Justice
Hughes wrote for the majority:
There is no constitutional ground for denying to the
Congress the power expressly to prohibit and invalidate
contracts although previously made, and valid when made,
when they interfere with the carrying out of the policy it is
free to adopt. 169
F

Two aspects of the opinion stand out for purposes of this discussion.
First, despite explicit reference to emergency in the preamble to the Joint
Resolution, the Court refused to carve out a temporary emergency regime
for contract abrogation. 170 This followed from the court’s reliance on the
last of the Legal Tender Cases, Juilliard v. Greenman, which upheld the
government’s power after the Civil War to issue paper money and make it
legal tender in peacetime. 171 Second, also flowing from Juilliard, the
Court would not limit the ruling strictly to the Congress’s power to coin
money. Instead, it affirmed Congressional capacity to strike contracts that
interfered with its macroeconomic powers, broadly defined. 172
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view from a contemporary, see, for example, John Dickinson, The Gold Decisions, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
715, 720 (1935) and Dawson, supra note 158, at 664.
169
Norman, 294 U.S. at 309–10, (1935).
170
Cf. Summary of the brief of Bankers Trust in Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. and United
States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240:
This Resolution is not, and does not purport to be, an emergency measure.
Besides, if this were an emergency measure, it would end with the emergency and
then the Railway Company would have to pay these bondholders what it agreed to
pay. But it purports to be legislation for all time.
171
Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884).
172
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935). Congress clearly had the
power to invalidate private contracts retroactively where they interfered with legitimate exercise of
government power. One contemporary commentator stressed that in all four cases, the majority and the
dissent broke over whether the clauses did in fact interfere with any government power, and what that
power was. See generally, Collier, supra note 151. Most agreed that the powers to coin currency and
establish its value were central to the decision; however, under Juilliard, these were derived not just
from the coinage power, but also from the taxing and borrowing powers of the government, among
others. Norman after Juilliard essentially cited the entire macroeconomic remit as the source of
Congressional power at issue. As noted earlier, most elite legal observers at the time considered
Norman an easy case and were not surprised by the outcome. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 158, at
664, 676 n.57 (“That the gold-clause resolution would be sustained by the Supreme Court was
predicted in all the published discussions of the subject”); see also Dickinson, supra note 168, at 716;
Richard Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1924 (1994) (“For the Justices that had
constituted the majority in Blaisdell, this was an easy case.”). The same view would likely prevail
today. See, e.g., Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to
Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 KY. L.J. 245, 285 & n.153 (“The Supreme
Court has consistently applied rational basis review and upheld federal laws that trample quite blatantly
on private contractual obligations,” citing among others Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A Gray
& Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984)).
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The clear and muscular tone of Norman was in contrast to the Chief
Justice’s argument in Perry v. U.S., a suit to enforce gold clauses in the
government’s World War I Liberty Bonds. 173 Hughes first held on due
process grounds that stripping the gold clauses from government debt was
repudiation, exceeding any Congressional power over currency. 174 Yet he
also wrote that the Congress’s action caused the creditors no compensable
damage, since government restrictions on gold made it impossible for
creditors to obtain gold coin or sell it for paper dollars above the
government-established value. Moreover, deflation had increased the
purchasing power of the dollar: in the minds of many (apparently including
the Court), this would create a double windfall for the gold clause
creditor. 175
Justice Stone’s concurrence barely disguised contempt for all the
casuistry. He would rather have ruled simply that the government’s power
to issue enforceable debt could not trump its monetary power. Most
prominent critics agreed with Stone. 176 In an emotional dissent and still
more emotional remarks from the bench, Justice McReynolds compared
FDR to Nero and declared the Joint Resolution an exercise in lawlessness,
rights-trampling and repudiation. 177 His opinion for the four dissenters
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Another case involving gold certificates issued by the government was disposed of quickly on
the theory that the certificates required payment in gold, whose value was determined solely by the
U.S. government, and which were tendered before the devaluation of 1934. Unable to sell gold on the
world markets, the creditor sustained no meaningful loss and was therefore not entitled to sue in the
Court of Claims. Norz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935). Perry potentially involved payment of
gold value in paper dollars in connection with an obligation tendered after devaluation.
Between the passage of the Joint Resolution and the time the cases were heard, the government’s
gold clause debt had gone down to $12 billion, and was less than half the total debt stock as a result of
refinancing with new, clause-free debt. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 349 (1935).
174
Perry, 294 U.S. at 350, 354. Hughes wrote that removing the gold clauses violated “a
fundamental principle” guaranteeing “the integrity of the public obligations,” which he derived from
the government’s power to incur debt and the statement that such debt was inviolable. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was “confirmatory” of the fundamental principle. Id.; see also
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV
504, 539 (1987) (a summary of reactions to Perry among legal scholars in the 1930s).
175
Dam, supra note 148, at 517, 525.
176
Perry, 294 U.S. at 359–61 (Stone, J., concurring). SCHLESINGER, supra note 167, at 259.
Stone privately disapproved of the gold measure. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT 35 (1998). Hughes’ opinion attracted scathing criticism for incoherence, and for leaving the
door open to future lawsuits should the paper dollar decline in purchasing power terms. See generally
Dawson, supra note 158; Dickinson, supra note 168; Henry M. Hart, Jr., Gold Clause in United States
Bonds, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1934–1935). Judge Learned Hand complemented Stone and scoffed at
Hughes’ attempt to “trick up” government debt: “‘Everybody dealing with a sovereign knows he is
dealing with a creature who can welch if he wants to welch. To trick up a lot of international stuff as
though it were law frankly makes me puke, as dear old Holmes used to say.’” SCHLESINGER, supra
note 167, at 259–60; see also Friedman, supra note 172, at 1926, n.173; Currie, supra note 174, at 539.
177
McReynolds’ passionate extemporaneous remarks were originally reported in the Wall Street
Journal; a toned-down version appeared as the official dissent in the cases. Perry, 294 U.S. at 361
(McReynolds, J., dissenting); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 144; ; SCHLESINGER,
supra note 168, at 260; Justice McReynolds’ Remarks on Gold Case Decision, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
1935, at 1.
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covered all four cases; he found none more sympathetic than the other.
The contrast between the majority’s construction of the gold clause
episode, especially in Norman, as an exercise in regulation, and the
dissent’s view of the same episode as a suspension of legality, is
instructive. It is essentially the difference between ordinary regulation and
emergency discussed earlier in this article. Yet the incident was neither
ordinary nor lawless.
All the Gold Clause Cases, but especially Norman, differed from the
Court’s earlier validation of state foreclosure moratoria. In Home Building
& Loan v. Blaisdell, decided a year earlier, Hughes writing for the majority
upheld Minnesota’s 1933 extension of the debtors’ right to redeem real
property from foreclosure as a valid exercise of state police power in an
emergency. 178 To be sure, the Court was construing the Constitution’s
explicit bar on state interference with private contracts. 179 The Minnesota
law also specifically limited itself to the duration of the emergency. In the
Gold Clause Cases and Blaisdell alike, emergency provided the context for
the exercise of existing government power. In Blaisdell unlike the others,
it also provided the predicate and the time window. 180
Blaisdell moreover represented a different sort of interference in
contracts.
Minnesota’s suspension of mortgage enforcement was
discretionary and case-by-case, in the hands of a judge responding to a
specific debtor’s application for relief. 181 In contrast, the legislative
history of the Joint Resolution, the arguments for the debtors and creditors,
and the opinions in the Gold Clause Cases all emphatically divorced the
government measure from any given party’s capacity to perform. The gold
clauses were a problem for the government across the board; all were
stricken wholesale. 182
The immediate distribution effects of the gold measure are hard to
discern. On its face, the Joint Resolution was a radical move to transfer
wealth from creditors to debtors. 183 But who exactly held the debt and
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Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
180
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n., 290 U.S. at 420; see GROSS & NI AIOLAIN, supra note 36, at 76–
77 (describing Blaisdell as an instance of “interpretive accommodation” of emergency powers by the
judiciary).
181
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n., 290 U.S. at 417–19. Later some scholars argued that the judiciary
was the more appropriate branch to deal with unsustainable gold clause contracts, and criticized the
wholesale approach of the Joint Resolution: “A legislature, by its very nature, can have no knowledge
of the intent of parties to individual private contracts, the very kind of factual determination courts are
specially suited to decide.” GOLD, MONEY AND THE LAW 5 (Manne & Miller eds., 1975).
182
Text of the Two Reports on the Gold Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at 2. For
example, Hart argued that the Gold Resolution could have been upheld with respect to government debt
because it “was made to apply evenhandedly to all obligations,” including government and private
bonds alike. Hart, supra note 176, at 1092.
183
Dam, supra note 148, at 521. Although he explains the gold measure as primarily distributive,
not monetary, Dam acknowledges the ambiguous outcome of distribution in this case. Id.
179
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equity at the time? Despite heated populist rhetoric, beneficiaries included
some of the country’s richest men. This is in part because holding
company pyramids that dominated corporate America at the time
concentrated stock ownership in the hands of a few industry captains, and
leveraged operating companies through massive bond issues and bank
borrowing. 184 As the largest debtors, the U.S. government, states,
municipalities, and foreign governments, benefited too, and with them their
taxpayers. 185 Mortgagors and other individual debtors also had gold
clauses in their long-term debt contracts and got relief; however, unlike
corporate obligations, these are not documented in detail.
The losers were not all widows and orphans either, despite passionate
speeches to the contrary from the Congressional opponents of the Joint
Resolution. 186 Even as the Liberty Bond campaign and the 1920s boom
brought new investors into the markets, 187 the actual number of retail
bondholders at the time of the crash was relatively small, likely fewer than
a million. 188 Banks, pension and insurance companies dominated; banks
were especially vulnerable in light of their huge “security loan” operations,
which effectively underwrote a large portion of the country’s retail
investing adventures. 189
Notwithstanding any direct redistribution effected by the Joint
Resolution, both stocks and bonds rallied on news of the Supreme Court
decisions in the Gold Clause Cases. 190 Randall Kroszner’s recent study of
the market reaction suggested that the bondholders may have seen debt
relief as contributing to their debtors’ capacity to pay. Creditors also may
have welcomed the certainty of having the abrogation question decided,
and may have benefited directly from rising stock prices (according to
another study, most corporate debt issues before the crash of 1929 had
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See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 101–02 (1946) (describing the leverage
problem in utility holding companies); EDWIN P. HOYT, JR., THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 375 (1966)
(discussing the prevalence of holding companies in the corporate sector generally); SELIGMAN, supra
note 66, at 129–30 (describing holding company structures). The effect of Roosevelt’s gold policy on
the debt stock of his companies may have contributed to J.P. Morgan’s support for going off the gold
standard. SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 202 (1958). High leverage was not limited to holding
company pyramids. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, one of the defendants in the Gold Clause Cases, was
both notably leveraged and operationally vulnerable. WIGMORE, supra note 141, at 37.
185
Gold Obligations Are $100,000,000,000; Federal Bonds Total $22,000,000,000, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1933, at 2.
186
Text of the Two Reports on the Gold Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at 2 (minority
report).
187
CHARLES CORTEZ ABBOTT, THE NEW YORK BOND MARKET 1920–1930, 52–53, 153 (1937);
SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at 25.
188
LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 241.
189
ABBOTT, supra note 187, at 37–39, 154, 182–83. “Security loan” refers to bank lending for the
purchase of securities, not the lending of securities themselves. But see WIGMORE, supra note 141, at
287, 552–53 (describing small bank sales of railroad bonds in 1931, and banks’ withdrawal from the
corporate bond market in favor of U.S. Treasuries).
190
See generally Kroszner, supra note 154.

538

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:493

191

equity “kickers”).
The real distributive significance of the gold policies likely went
beyond the parties to the gold clause obligations. As noted earlier, it was
about the relative power of bankers, farmers and upstart entrepreneurs, and
the structure of the economy to come.
F

D. Argentina 2001–-2002

22B

Kroszner’s study of market response to the Gold Clause Cases began
making the rounds in the late 1990s, with obvious policy relevance in the
wake of the Asian financial crisis. 192 However, it was not until
Argentina’s foreign bond default and mass redenomination of domestic
dollar contracts in 2001-2002 that FDR’s gold lessons were applied
directly in a contemporary context. 193
To put Argentina’s latest crisis response in context, it helps to go back
to another crisis a decade earlier. Facing hyperinflation, a mountain of
debt and a spate of bank runs, Argentina imposed a bank holiday and
mandated the exchange of domestic term bank deposits into government
bonds in January 1990. 194 When depositors sued, Argentina’s highest
court reached for its own 1930s jurisprudence, which upheld a foreclosure
moratorium and interest rate caps on economic emergency grounds. The
1934 Argentine ruling relied explicitly on Blaisdell and a doctrine of
economic emergency. 195
In an effort to stabilize prices and perhaps prevent future crises,
Argentina pegged its currency at par to the U.S. dollar. Initially successful
against hyperinflation, this “convertibility” regime framed Argentine
politics and economic development in the 1990s. But in the second half of
the decade, the dollar gained in value as Argentine exports stagnated. The
government was locked into massive fiscal transfers.
After a series of external shocks and four years of recession, Argentina
defaulted on $100 billion in debt and abandoned convertibility on
Christmas Eve 2001. The legislature also passed a law converting dollardenominated debts under $100,000 into pesos at 1:1. In February 2002,
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WIGMORE, supra note 141, at 27.
The paper was presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition in May 1999, entitled “Global Financial Crises: Implications for Banking
and Regulation” (program at http://www.chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_
events/bsc_1999.cfm).
193
Calomiris et al., supra note 58, at 14 (citing Kroszner’s study in the Argentina case study);
Kroszner, supra note 154, at 1, 4–6 (drawing a parallel between the gold clause episode and
Argentina’s “pesoification”).
194
Int’l Monetary Fund Pol’y Dev. & Rev. Dep’t, Sovereign Debt Restructurings and the
Domestic Economy: Experience in Four Recent Cases 14 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/NP/pdr/sdrm/2002/022102.pdf (describing “Plan BONEX”).
195
Spector, supra note 11, at 135–38. The Contract Clause and federalism concerns of the U.S.
constitution, prominent in Blaisdell, did not appear to migrate into Argentine jurisprudence.
192
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the Executive promulgated an emergency decree redenominating all dollar
contracts and bank deposits into deeply devalued pesos. 196 However, the
“pesification” was asymmetric: debts to banks were converted 1:1, while
deposits got a boost at 1:1.4. The reasons for the precise number
difference are murky; the result was that at least initially, banks were stuck
with subsidizing their debtors and their depositors to the tune of forty cents
on the dollar.
During the last year before default, banks had suffered a series of runs
and had become deeply undercapitalized. Bank owners complained
bitterly about the asymmetric aspect of pesification and threatened to walk
away from their banks. The government soon relented and issued domestic
law, dollar-denominated compensation bonds to banks. The banks would
carry the debt on their books at face value, despite the fact that the
government was in default on $100 billion in foreign debt. On the other
hand, the government scrupulously serviced over $20 billion in new
domestic bonds even as it kept its old foreign bondholders out in the cold.
This attempt to subordinate foreign creditors compounded the effects of
debt reprofiling operations in late 2001, which allowed Argentina to
separate domestic and foreign creditors and engage in selective default. 197
The “pesification” measures had a profound economic impact because
dollar contracts were so prevalent in Argentina before default. Pesification
brought as much as 75% debt relief for large companies, but also for scores
of small debtors. A recent study suggests that the measure also promoted
quick resumption of investment by large firms, and contributed to the
recovery of Argentina’s banking sector. 198
The legal fallout was somewhat more complex. Most of the
emergency measures were ultimately upheld, though not before politicallycharged personnel changes on the Argentine Supreme Court. The court
continued to use its Blaisdell-inspired jurisprudence to imply broad
emergency powers in the Executive to modify contracts. 199
The Argentine courts’ reliance on Blaisdell to uphold redenomination
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Id. at 139; The Republic of Arg., Prospectus Supplement, at 112–14 (Dec. 27, 2004), available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm#108.
See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 182–86 (describing pesification, subsequent
lawsuits and compensation awards).
197
MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 42–49, 74–75
(2002); STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 177–87.
198
See generally Calomiris et al., supra note 58 (comparing Argentina’s case favorably with
Mexico’s in the aftermath of the 1994–1995 crisis; Mexico devalued, but did not redenominate, and
suffered a much slower recovery of investment).
199
Spector, supra note 11, at 142–44 (pointing to the reliance of the Argentine courts on Home
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell in the Bustos v. Estado Nationale / amparo and Massa v. Poder
Ejecutivo National—DecretoNo. 1.570/01 cases applying the doctrine of economic emergency
(citations omitted)). However, in a handful of earlier and lower court cases, the government was
mandated to pay compensation. Spector, supra note 11, at 140 (discussing Smith v. P.E.N. / medidas
cautelares (citation omitted)).
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is notable, since the U.S. case was decided under the Contract Clause and
was heavily influenced by federalism concerns. Norman might have made
for better precedent, if not a better transplant. The explanation may be as
simple as timing: the leading Argentine case transplanting Blaisdell was
decided in 1934, before the U.S. Supreme Court had spoken on the Gold
Clause Cases. Like Blaisdell, the 1934 Avico case dealt with mortgage
foreclosures. 200 Subsequent cases reviewing currency crisis measures cited
to the 1934 domestic precedent. But there may be a thicker explanation,
such as the Argentine legal system’s preference for a distinct legal regime,
specified ex-ante, to govern emergencies. 201 The Norman model of
workaday regulation, which can look strained even at home, would not fit
well with a state of siege regime for addressing financial crisis.
In retrospect, Argentina’s approach to debt distress in the middle of its
last currency crisis was unusual for making the government’s distribution
policies explicit. An early attempt to limit debt relief to small contracts
gave way to general debt reduction, which at first was going to be funded
out of bank capital. 202 When banks turned out to be insolvent and
protested, the cost of the debtor subsidy shifted to the general public. This
may have privileged large domestic firms and the middle class, who could
borrow in dollars before the crisis, relative to the poor. Argentina’s
lengthy default on foreign bonds helped shift some cost onto foreign
creditors.
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E. Mexico 1982
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Each of the four case studies so far has had an international dimension.
Indonesia’s currency collapse made its cross-border corporate debts
unsustainable; Japan’s failing financial firms were deeply enmeshed in the
global and regional markets; the United States’ gold policies were part of
the demise of the international gold standard; and Argentina delinked its
currency from the U.S. dollar and defaulted on its foreign bonds. My last
case study offers a twist on cross-border crisis management.
What came to be known as the Third World Debt Crisis took up most
of the 1980s and early 1990s. 203 Its origins are commonly traced to oil
F

F

200
Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico, Don Oscar Agustín v. de la Pesa, don
Saúl G. / sobre consignación de intereses,” Fallos (1934-172-21) (Arg.), http://www.garridocordobera.
com.ar/pagina_ nueva_572.htm.
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GROSS & NI AOLAIN, supra note 36, at 26–27 (discussing the use of the French “state of siege”
model of emergency legality in Latin America, including Argentina); see also Spector, supra note 11,
at 134.
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Spector, supra note 11, at 139.
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The crisis is the subject of an enormous literature, primarily in economics and political
science. For an authoritative treatment by a law scholar, see ROSS P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS
DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 5–24 (1999). See also generally THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert,
eds., 1989) (providing an economic and political science perspective); DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT
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price shocks of the 1970s, which filled U.S. and U.K. banks with deposits
from oil-exporting economies. The influx of “petrodollars” in turn
catalyzed a bank lending spree throughout the developing world, but
especially in Latin America, where governments and private firms
borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars from foreign banks. 204 A world
recession and spiking interest rates in the lending countries brought the
boom to a screeching halt in August 1982.
In the much-repeated account of one U.S. Treasury official, on August
13, 1982, Mexico’s Finance Minister Jesus Silva Herzog “showed up on
our doorstep and turned his pockets inside out.” 205 Having borrowed
upwards of $50 billion dollars from foreign banks, 206 Mexico was having
trouble refinancing its debt, and was hemorrhaging reserves. After a week
of intense talks with U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve, and international
officials, the Finance Minister told a room of 800 bankers in New York
that Mexico was out of money, and asked for a 90-day moratorium on
principal payments. 207 An advisory committee of large and highly exposed
banks was formed to help coordinate the refinancing of private debt in
tandem with support from the IMF and other foreign public sources. 208
The wholesale, yet nominally voluntary, approach was orchestrated by
U.S. and international finance officials. It became a model for crises to
come. By October 1983, twenty-seven countries had followed in Mexico’s
footsteps. 209 The approach made sense because the debtors’ problems
were to an extraordinary degree the problems of the U.S. banking sector.
In the words of one Mexican participant:
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

We didn’t crawl to the international financial community
as debtors seeking relief through some minor adjustment that
could be made backstage. We walked through the front door.
We said we had a major problem with a capital P. We didn’t
say the problem was a particular debt. We said the problem
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989) (economics); BARBARA STALLINGS &
ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, DEBT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (1989) (political science); Jeremy

Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A
Bargaining-Theoretic Framework, 35 IMF STAFF PAPERS 644 (1988) (economics); Nelson, supra note
57 (political science).
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WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT REEXAMINED 60 (1995) (listing Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Venezuela and the Philippines as the five largest debtors, accounting for over 70% of total
developing countries’ external debt in 1982); see also KARIN LISSAKERS, BANKS, BORROWERS AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT: A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 84 (1991)
(noting that most private sector debt was assumed by the governments in the course of the crisis).
205
LISSAKERS, supra note 204, at 84.
206
CLINE, supra note 204, at 61 (citing Bank for International Settlements statistics). This was
over 50% of the size of the economy, and over 300% of Mexico’s exports. Id. at 66. Other sources cite
debt stock figures as high as $80 billion. JOSEPH KRAFT, THE MEXICAN RESCUE 4, 35 (1984).
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See KRAFT, supra note 206, at 21–22 (offering a detailed journalistic account of the drama
surrounding Mexico’s moratorium).
208
See id.
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BUCKLEY, supra note 203, at 6.
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was the whole international financial structure. We said it
was everybody’s problem. 210
F

This was not a wild exaggeration. In 1982, 17% of Chase bank’s
assets were in Latin America and the Caribbean; the figures were similar
for Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical, and other major U.S.
banks. Some of the largest U.S. banks derived a third of their net income
in 1982 from operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, which had
been growing rapidly over the previous decade. 211 U.S. bank exposure to
developing country debt stood at 166% of total bank capital in 1982;
Mexico alone accounted for over a third. 212 At a time when the U.S.
banking system was undercapitalized, under-provisioned, and already
straining from domestic economic pressures, a cascade of developing
country defaults presented “the risk of a 1930s-style international financial
crisis. 213
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In October 1982, the IMF proposed to lend Mexico more money, but
only if the private banks would do the same. Just then, U.S. regulators let
it be known that participating banks would not have to make loan-loss
provisions on Mexican loans on the theory that concerted action would
make Mexico a better credit prospect. 214 The public premise behind the
initial concerted lending strategy was that the borrowing countries were
illiquid, not insolvent, and capable of recovering without debt reduction. 215
The initial refinancings were thus negotiated case-by-case at market rates,
which contributed to a sharp rise in the debt stock of the borrowing
countries, which in turn exacerbated their economic decline. 216 Put
differently, the new loans in the first instance stuck the Mexican
government and its tax paying public with the full burden of unraveling
foreign banks’ risky loans. With U.S. banks lacking capital and loan-loss
cushions, and with U.S. regulators unwilling to see mass bank failure, the
initial response to developing country debt difficulties concentrated losses
with the borrowing populations.
By 1989, the approach shifted again. The debt crisis showed few signs
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Angel Gurria, quoted in KRAFT, supra note 206, at 3.
See RAUL L. MADRID, OVEREXPOSED: U.S. BANKS CONFRONT THE THIRD WORLD DEBT
CRISIS 48–49, 59 (1990).
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CLINE, supra 204, at 72–73.
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Id. at 205.
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See id. at 205–06.
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See id. at 92. Over twenty years later, participants acknowledge, at least in private
conversations, that the diagnosis of illiquidity was a product of the lenders’ inability to absorb the
necessary losses at the time.
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See id. at 206–08; see also John Clark, Debt Reduction and Market Reentry Under the Brady
Plan, 18 FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REV. 38, 39–40 (Winter 1993–94), available at http://www.
nyfrb.org/research/quarterly_review/1993v18/v18n4article3.pdf (“By 1989, this basic case-by-case
approach had achieved some measure of success . . . [n]onetheless, important strains had emerged,
leading to deeping fatigue and frustration for both debtors and creditors.”).
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of abating despite successive rescheduling innovations on the part of
private and official participants. Private banks grew wary of the endless
stream of “voluntary” new lending, and were beginning to balk at official
requests. 217 But they also fortified themselves against further losses.
Beginning in 1987, U.S. banks raised capital and set aside loan-loss
provisions, with the largest banks booking “the worst . . . profits since the
Great Depression” in the first year of the new strategy. 218
In 1989, the Brady Plan (named after the U.S. Treasury Secretary who
presided over its launch) offered to exchange banks’ loans for tradable
bonds, some collateralized with U.S. Treasury securities. The plan was
still technically voluntary. 219 Principal reduction was the central plank of
the plan, along with a standardized menu of restructuring options for
creditors to choose from. By some calculations, Mexico received in excess
of 30% principal relief in its first Brady deal in 1990.220 Yet another round
of regulatory forbearance helped boost participation: the U.S. Treasury
secured an interpretation of accounting rules from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that let banks avoid booking losses where
the total principal and interest payments on the new bonds over their
lifetime would “equal or exceed the book value of the loan.” 221 With 30year bonds, the standard was not hard to meet. The loan-for-bond
exchanges of the Brady Plan were a success by all counts, and eventually
catalyzed the establishment of today’s market for middle-income
countries’ sovereign debt. 222
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The case studies in this Part yield somewhat conflicting lessons. On
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See Lee C. Buchheit, Whatever Became of Old New Money? 9 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 11, 12
(1990) (“The amounts raised have been relatively modest and the coupons relatively high, but these are
unquestionably the first steps toward making good on the promise of ‘voluntary,’ open market
operations.”).
218
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the one hand, each of the very different governments involved, when
confronted with a severe financial crisis, had to make the choices I have
grouped under the rubric of containment—whether to deploy wholesale
measures to manage deep, widespread debt distress, whether to enforce
private contracts and government regulations despite the risk of general
default, and how to distribute losses. On the other hand, the way in which
the governments went about making containment choices reflected their
very specific economic, political and institutional settings. Factors such as
pre-crisis wealth distribution and business organization, a prior history of
financial crises, the cause and location of debt distress, and the legal
institutions for handling crises and non-crisis debt problems, all layered on
top of the general factors discussed in Part IV, helped determine the policy
outcomes.
Yet there were more commonalities. In every case, officials knew the
depth and breadth of the crisis before they had the political and legal
capacity for adequate response. Governments began with incremental
measures premised on no or very limited insolvency, and continued on this
path until they secured the political space and legal authority to deploy
robust containment policies. Collective action problems on a vast scale
stood in the way of crisis response. Non-crisis resolution and debt
management tools proved inadequate to contain the crisis and had to be
supplemented with some combination of new laws, dedicated institutions,
and regulatory adjustment—a process that took months, sometimes years.
Also in every case, containment policies began durable economic and
political shifts, which continued through resolution and re-regulation. And
with the partial exceptions of the United States and Argentina case studies,
major loss-distribution proceeded under the guise of loss-prevention,
implemented by ostensibly apolitical actors—central banks, international
institutions and even foreign bank regulators.
I conclude below with more implications of these and other
experiences with containment.
VI. CONCLUSION: CHOICES AT THE PRECIPICE

8B

This Article is an effort to map a category of decisions in financial
crisis, decisions made as policy makers stand at the edge of economic
catastrophe. Such decisions are often framed as a failure of regulation, and
a time for rule-breaking to be regretted when the storm passes. I have
argued that these decisions, which I group under the term financial crisis
containment, are unavoidable. They are also distinct from financial
regulation, crisis prevention, and crisis resolution.
I suggest that three kinds of policy decisions recur in very different
financial crises: first, whether the response should be wholesale or case-bycase; second, whether to enforce private contracts and government
regulations; and third, how to allocate losses. Importantly, this is not an
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argument for or against wholesale measures or breaking contracts. Part V
confirms that while containment choices are unavoidable, their outcomes
are deeply contextual and contingent on a slew of political and institutional
factors. Rather, I suggest that the three-part framing in Part IV can help
recast some well-worn crisis policy debates, and to make containment
decisions more transparent and accountable.
First, the choice between wholesale and case-by-case separates the
timing of crisis response from the intractable liquidity-solvency paradigm.
In the first instance, decisions about the timing of containment—and hence
the timing of the crisis—go to the adequacy of the existing infrastructure
for handling financial distress. In every case study in Part V, governments
struggled to adapt the existing tools to new circumstances, and found them
wanting.
They were also pressed to build political support for
extraordinary measures, which determined the timing of crisis response
perhaps more than any other factor. In most cases, the authorities knew
they were dealing with a solvency problem long before they found the
legal and political capacity to address it.
What might make for better containment decisions in this context? In
many cases, non-crisis bankruptcy and resolution techniques can localize
failure and limit the extent to which losses are socialized. Having usable
case-by-case restructuring tools and the political capacity to use them can
limit the need for wholesale measures without shifting the losses onto the
public. 223 Under some circumstances, the fear of bankruptcy and judicial
redistribution may beget a much bigger political risk of wholesale
restructuring and nationalization. But once the crisis has exceeded the
administrative capacity of non-crisis tools, a qualitative shift is in order:
simple, transparent, across-the-board measures that can work quickly and
can be readily understood by both the public and the markets can be
essential for containment. Reform of the existing infrastructure and
redress of containment inequities—long-range tasks that require complex
balancing of many constituencies—belong with resolution and regulation;
they demand more deliberation than containment can afford.
Second, posing the choice between rewriting and enforcing contracts
as inevitable puts the contract sanctity meme in a different light. Where
contract enforcement may have negative spillover effects, or where
performance is possible only with a public subsidy, “sanctity” loses its
absolute character and becomse a balancing test. Policy focus shifts to
assessing the spillover effects and the magnitude of the subsidy. The
question of rewriting contracts, like one of suspending regulation, becomes
one of how much, how long, and how often. Who does the rewriting is
key: for example, in the Argentina case study, the legislature and the
F
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Executive engaged in successive modifications; in the United States, the
legislature remained the lead, albeit under heavy influence of a powerful
Executive. In both cases, the courts played a complex legitimating role.
Having the power to rewrite contracts rest with the legislature seems
appropriate for two reasons: it makes the power harder to exercise, and
ensures broad-based accountability in the associated redistribution. On the
down side, a controversial decision to override contracts wholesale may
take too long to be useful as containment. But since the failure to act is
distributive, the legislature remains accountable for the consequences of its
inaction. On the other hand, giving the red pen to the Executive may make
rewriting contracts too easy, unless this authority is heavily circumscribed
to avoid effectively creating a parallel bankruptcy regime.
Third, stipulating distribution as a necessary element of containment
recasts the perennial crisis policy debate about moral hazard. Except
where the policy is pristine abstention, the risk of moral hazard is
unavoidable. The operative question again becomes not whether the
imprudent would be rescued, but rather which of the imprudent should be,
at what cost, and at whose expense. The debate becomes explicitly about
distribution.
To be sure, almost all government policies can distribute, 224 but
some—notably those that aim to contain a large-scale, fast-moving
financial crisis—can obscure their effect on distribution, even when it is
extreme. The case of Indonesia in Part V.A is a stark, but not a unique,
example of radically distributive policies that were rarely debated as
such. 225 The prevalence of central bank lending, even in well-known
solvency crises, and the popularity of large “conduit” institutions as targets
of government support, foster the impression that losses are avoidable, and
that in any event, limiting total losses makes everyone better off. By the
time this strategy runs its course, resource and power shifts may become a
source of path dependence. After a crisis, some institutions and
communities may be wiped out for good, while others may grow enormous
from government-assisted mergers and subsidies. The ethnic and political
landscape may shift dramatically. 226
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The possibility of dramatic and durable distribution should be an
important factor in allocating containment authority. Scholars in different
disciplines have observed that the Executive tends to gain in crisis; some
have suggested it is inevitable and probably sensible. 227 Less prominent
but critically important is the rising stock of independent agencies, notably
central banks, whose lending authorities can become indispensable to the
political branches in the containment project. 228 The courts are often
marginal in a fast-moving crisis, though they may gain power in a
protracted one: it took over a year for the Gold Clause Cases to reach the
U.S. Supreme Court, but their political and economic salience for crisis
containment remained high. 229 The legislators’ role is harder to gauge:
they may be slow and unmotivated 230 but they can also serve important—if
disorderly—gatekeeping and legitimating functions when the Executive
and independent agencies come to it for new authority. Perhaps more
importantly, legislative debates and hearings can condition the politics of
crisis response: they can spread public awareness of dire economic
circumstances and chart a course for both containment and reform. 231
The Executive’s role in a financial crisis and its relationship with the
monetary authorities go to the heart of the containment challenge. The
Executive is presumed to be politically accountable; it can act quickly and
flexibly, integrating diverse policy areas in its crisis response. 232 However,
the Executive’s authority to distribute is circumscribed by the legislature,
and its actions are more visible than those of the central bank—an attribute
of accountability that can make the Executive politically vulnerable. In
theory, the central bank is technically competent and better able to guard
against time inconsistency, which is a particular problem in crisis
containment; however, it is poorly placed to preside over messy, largeF
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scale distribution. The central bank’s expansive powers to lend and create
money are premised on the idea that it does not distribute. 233
An Executive that is facing a hostile legislature—or is otherwise
politically vulnerable—may come to need the central bank in crisis not just
for its traditional monetary policy functions, but for its regulatory and less
traditional transactional powers. 234 Collaborating with the central bank
may help the Executive to avoid the legislature, but also to diminish
accountability at the height of the crisis. If crisis containment were a
purely technical project with fixed distributional consequences, this would
be a minor concern. But it rarely, if ever, is purely technical. The result
can be damaging for both the Executive and the central bank: where their
containment collaboration is perceived as illegitimate, it may fail, and
result in loss of crisis-management authority going forward. Regulators
and foreign actors, such as the IMF, stand in a similar relationship to the
Executive: they can be its indispensable partners in containment, but can
also help reduce accountability and get caught in the political fallout.
The intricate tradeoffs of allocating authority over crisis containment,
and more broadly crisis response, merit more study beyond the scope of
this Article. Perhaps the biggest question, explored in proposals such as
“Super Chapter 11” and echoing the emergency literature, is whether there
should be a standing ex-ante legal regime for crisis containment. The
advantage is predictability. The fear is that governments will be tempted
to use emergency powers willy-nilly, at best requiring constant
recalibration of ex-ante procedural hurdles. This Article suggests that
many if not most of the tools of crisis containment are within the existing
scope of government authority. The challenge is to use them in a way that
is legitimate and accountable.
My goal has been to draw attention to containment policies as a
distinct category of policy choice that deserves more analytical scrutiny
than it has received to date. The core consistency of crisis policies across
very different cultural, institutional, and historical settings is revealing.
Crisis response is necessarily fraught with moral hazard and political risk.
Containment measures inevitably contravene non-crisis policy wisdom and
legal norms. But governments and private actors invoke extraordinary
measures routinely. Acknowledging that crises will return, rules will be
suspended, and emergency tools will be used, should prompt a critical
examination of when, how, by whom, and to whose benefit.
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